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Intro
The world is literally falling apart. Each day brings talk of the end of another multilateral trade
agreement, treaty, or alliance. Some of this is action: the U.K. and the E.U., the U.S. and the
T.P.P., and some is posturing: France and the E.U, the U.S. and NAFTA. Nonetheless, it raises
the question of how one is to feel about these movements of devolution towards political and
economic isolationism.
Seeking an answer, I turned towards Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. As
Federalists who sought to unite thirteen politically distinct states, they can provide strong
arguments against devolution. In doing so however, I found a cure to the ill of which devolution
is the symptom. Specifically, I discovered an example provided by Aristotle of the payments for
civil service which were instituted in Athens during the reign of Pericles for those who attended
the Assembly. Though well known, these payments’ capacity to stave off devolution has thus far
been overlooked.
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In a modern twist, I discuss the possibilities for social media to replicate, and even
improve upon, the Athenian Assembly as it existed under Pericles. Most crucially, it facilitates
communication, the mechanism by which Aristotle implies attendance at the Assembly can foster
political unity and avoid devolution. Further, due to its growing popularity, the state need not use
coercive means to ensure citizens in fact “attend” social media; they need only provide them the
leisure to do so.
In the second half of the paper, I attempt to square my proposal of Periclean payments for
social media usage with Lockean liberal rights to private property. To do so, I invoke two staples
of liberal thought regarding property: Locke’s chapter “On Property” from his Second Treatise
and one contemporary political scientist’s liberal defense of the modern “workfare” state.
Currently, any payments from the American government to its citizens meant to directly elevate
their welfare must be based upon receiving reciprocal benefits in return. These are typically
gained by exacting labor; unless one considers using social media as performing labor, this
requirement surely dooms my plan.
However, I will argue that when we take these two liberal arguments together and view
them in light of recent economic scholarship, we find that staying true to Locke in fact requires
transfers of wealth identical to those which enable social media usage. While land was the
primary point of departure for Locke’s economy, our most valuable resource is not land but
knowledge. The modern method of production which utilizes knowledge has a name:
informational capitalism. Because of knowledge’s unique status as a widely dispersed and
societally-produced non-rival good--as opposed to land--Locke’s ideas on private property must
no longer be read literally. Instead, their principles must be unearthed in relation to the mode of
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production which he understood. Only then may we seek to realize those principles by forming
solutions relevant to our own economy. This is the method I employ.

Abstract

The argument is as follows, with chapter numbers corresponding:
(I-III): Positive argument--why social media does remedy devolution
I.

Providing arguments made by Hamilton and others against devolution for economic and
political concerns. Showing further evidence that the American Constitution was ratified
on a notion of community over coherence, the reverse of the principle upholding
devolution arguments.

II.

Explanation of how Pericles’ payments for civic duty eased social tension by increasing
communication. Showing why, for practical and ideological purposes, Aristotle approved
of these payments.

III.

Argument using sociological research to suggest social media usage can provide the
same benefits to us as the Assembly did for the Athenians. Analysis of an example of
such a benefit: the removal of the Confederate flag outside of South Carolina
statehouses.

(IV-VI) : Negative argument--why transferring wealth does not violate Lockean property rights

8

IV.

Affirmation of the efficiency thesis reading of Locke’s property rights by way of
defeating a common objection. A novel, more accurate redefinition of labor employed to
do so.

V.

Explanation of the American commitment to the workfare state in which individuals
must labor in return for wealth transfers from the government. Showing why this
ultimately relies upon the notion of reciprocity, understood as an exact one-to-one
correspondence between a state’s giving and taking to any one specific citizen.

VI.

Analysis of Lockean liberalism’s dual commitments to the efficiency thesis and
reciprocity in light of economic of modern modes of production. Argument that the rise
of informational capitalism--in which the most valuable resource is knowledge--implies
political transfers of wealth in order to uphold these preexisting liberal commitments.
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I. Devolution

On June 23rd, 2016, the United Kingdom voted by popular referendum to leave the European
Union. On January 20th of the following year, newly-inaugurated American President Donald
Trump declared in front of the Lincoln memorial: “from this moment on, it’s going to be
America First,” and subsequently withdrew the U.S. from global trade agreements12 . In France,
presidential candidate Marine Le Pen describes political divisions as “no longer between the left
and the right, but between the patriots and the globalists,”3 offering her support to the former.
The “existence” of the French people, she says, depends upon their retreat--like counterparts in
Britain and the U.S.--from the “tyrannies” of globalization.
These examples highlight a larger global movement of devolution, the “surrender of
powers to local authorities by a central government”4 . For President Trump, devolution is
synonymous with a transference of power to the “People.” Through political isolation, he claims
the United States will make sure every “decision” from trade to immigration, is made solely to
benefit Americans. Whatever its merit, his plan was popular enough to get him elected.
Fever for devolution is not restricted to the Right. In California, an amendment for
secession is likely to make the ballot in 2019. Leaders of the movement attest that isolation
would allow the achievement of “progressive” aims like gun control and universal health care.

1

"The Inaugural Address." The White House. The United States Government, 30 Jan. 2017. Web. 02 May 2017.

2

Mui, Ylan Q. "Withdrawal from Trans-Pacific Partnership Shifts U.S. Role in World Economy."The Washington
Post. WP Company, 23 Jan. 2017. Web. 02 May 2017.
3

Henley, Jon. "Marine Le Pen Promises Liberation from the EU with France-first Policies." The Guardian.
Guardian News and Media, 05 Feb. 2017. Web. 02 May 2017.
4

"Devolution." Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 02 May 2017.
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Fever has also spread to the remaining members of the E.U., whose economic and political union
was formed in 1993; its current president states that many Europeans are “returning to a regional
mindset,” an unfortunate development in his eyes 5.

i. Economic Implausibility
Many argue that due to the economic benefits of globalization, and the corresponding need for
political bodies to enforce adherence to agreed-upon rules between trading states, devolution is
unlikely to be carried out in practice. Though nationalistic policies have catchy slogans--e.g.
Trump’s ”Buy American and Hire American” executive order6--they cannot fulfill what they
promise without experiencing a decreased level of economic well-being. Rich countries are far
too used to employing cheap labor and paying low prices for goods produced abroad to turn
back. In effect, globalization is a “relentless force, difficult to slow, stop, or reverse” (Schaeffer
12).
Nayan Chanda, editor of YaleGlobal, a magazine publishing focused on globalization,
describes the problem as such: “To truly begin deglobalisation, its proponents should throw their
iPhones, or for that matter any handset in the dustbin because they may not find any model that
is produced in one country”7. Though devolution is a fine idea, there is a reason globalization
was pursued in the first place: the economic benefits brought forth by dividing labor between
nations and trading. Opponents do not acknowledge the necessary economic logic behind
5

Spiegel. "Home." Jean-Claude Juncker: The Demons Haven't Been Banished. Trans. Paul Cohen. Pro Europa, 6
July 2012. Web. 02 May 2017.
6"Presidential

Executive Order on Buy American and Hire American." The White House. The United States
Government, 18 Apr. 2017. Web. 02 May 2017.
7Chanda,

Nayan. "Of Reversing Globalization." Of Reversing Globalization | YaleGlobal Online. ABP Pvt Ltd
Publication Copyright, 02 Aug. 2011. Web. 02 May 2017
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globalization and thus are liable to characterize it as a set of “ad hoc solutions,” contingent upon
political will and liable to be reversed through policy. What they fail to realize that while citizens
may indeed support devolution in theory, they are unlikely to support of the impacts it has on
their wallets. As to devolution’s growing popularity nonetheless, “the facts,” Chanda writes,
“seldom stand in the way of a catchy slogan” (like Buy American).
Great Britain’s actions following its “Brexit” from the E.U. provide a cautionary tale.
Premised on economic nationalism, Brexit is nonetheless likely to result in another free-trade
agreement with the E.U., similar to the one already in place. Swedish economist Fredrik Erixon
comments:
Economic logic may not be a good basis for predicting policy in this age of growing economic nationalism, but
we’re not talking about a complex, labyrinthine Sykes-Picot endeavour. The task for trade negotiators now is to
avoid a collapse of current trade, not to break up markets for new trade.8

Despite political support for economic and political isolation, its full implementation is likely to
be tempered by concern for preservation of the status quo, itself a result of past globalization.
Politically and rhetorically isolated, countries will remain economically dependent, lacking
institutional structures to further coordinate towards shared goals: “no more common standards
for consumer and environmental policy or joint rules for farm subsidies and state aid to
industries”.9 While trade is preserved, inescapable political issues surrounding it are left
unaddressed. This includes decisions both strategic: “policy makers would set their country’s
tariffs at the noncooperative levels identified by the static Nash equilibrium,” and ethical: “An
example of a local concern for market outcomes in other countries arises when citizens disdain

8

Erixon, Fredrik. "Britain and the EU Probably Will Reach a Trade Deal. Here's Why." The Spectator. N.p., 29 Mar.
2017. Web. 02 May 2017.
9

Erixon, Fredrik. "Britain and the EU Probably Will Reach a Trade Deal. Here's Why." The Spectator. N.p., 29 Mar.
2017. Web. 02 May 2017.
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the use of child labor, even if it occurs outside the borders of their country” (Grossman 6,16)
(emphasis mine). So long as citizens seek to avoid a general decline in wealth, it is unlikely full
devolution will be carried out. Insofar as economic ties remain, political ones will be necessary
to achieve optimal output and address ethical concerns.

ii. Ideological Danger
Not only is devolution unlikely to be wholeheartedly pursued, leaving trading nations without
much needed political safeguards, but its pursuit is an ideological danger as well. Its
implementation increases instability both by setting an anti-democratic precedent and by the very
nature of the smaller nations it creates. This was understood by noted globalists like the
Federalists, who supported the ratification of the Constitution and unification of thirteen states
under one federal government, and Abraham Lincoln, who sought to revive political ties between
the North and South.
Devolution sets a precedent that is antithetical to the formation of democratic political
community. Describing his own effort fighting devolution, Abraham Lincoln said the Union
soldiers who fell at Gettysburg “shall not have died in vain,” for their victory ensured “that
government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”10 His
conclusion, democracy perishing, far outweighs any actual immediate consequences of the
South’s secession. Democratic governance would in theory reign in both nations, albeit
separately. However, Lincoln is aware that once society’s commitments to its factional interests-in this case slavery--are allowed to outweigh its commitments to political unity, the very

10

"The Gettysburg Address." The Gettysburg Address by Abraham Lincoln. Ed. Roy P. Basler. Abraham Lincoln
Online, n.d. Web. 02 May 2017.
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possibility of democratic community, premised as it is upon a privileging of unity amongst
difference, is doomed.
California provides an example of this principle at work: as some seek secession from the
U.S., others seek secession from each other. The National Review’s John Fund writes: “Let the
sprawling, diverse state divide up into two or more states to ease tensions between farmers and
coastal types, defuse the war of ideology between Left and Right, and allow more policy
experimentation” 11. Similarly, John Adams once remarked that a “simple government” must “of
necessity split into two parties,” no matter its initial homogeneity (Adams 292). However, if we
dissolve government each time such a split occurs, democracy will forever find itself in a
precarious position, liable to “perish from the earth.”
Along with these effects on stability, devolution also creates instability by leaving smaller
political bodies in its wake. James Madison writes in Federalist number ten: “Extend the
[political] sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other
citizens” (Hamilton et al. 78). In contrast, a smaller political body makes it more likely that a
majority of individuals may be motivated by the same interest, allowing them to control the arms
of state power without regard for others. A larger body tends to a greater diversity of interests,
meaning a majority is likely to only be gained through coalition-building. This makes it less
likely that all members of the majority have an interest in “invading the rights” of particular
citizens. By protecting citizens‘ rights, a larger state makes it less likely that ideological
dissension will lead to complete political revolt.

11Fund,

John. "California Shouldn't Secede from the U.S." National Review. NRO, 29 Jan. 2017. Web. 02 May 2017.
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Similarly, Aristotle writes that “large states are less liable to faction than small ones,
because in them the middle class is large; whereas in small states it is easy to divide all the
citizens into two classes who are either rich or poor and to leave nothing in the middle”(Aristotle
108). Once again, a populace increased in size tends to stability. Within, interests are not
concentrated on two sides who are each ready to deprive the other of their rights as soon as they
gain power. Instead, a third interest arises which in order to gain power must build a coalition
with one of the two sides. By doing so, the interests of each side is diluted, making it unlikely
that power will be abused, insofar as the middle class has an interest in preserving the body
politic. Thus increased size and the diversity of interests it engenders tend to stability by diluting
the interests of radicals which, if they were to be carried out, would likely lead to the dissolution
of the government due to the illegitimacy of its invasion of rights.

iii. History
a. Madison
All of this was well understood by America’s first globalizers, the Federalists. These men-Hamilton, Madison, and Jay--south to persuade the populace to ratify the Constitution, thereby
forming a union of the thirteen states under a powerful federal government. They affirmed in
their writings the primacy of forming political community over achieving ideological coherence
within that community. This contrasts with contemporary devolution activists who seek
ideological agreement, whether it be “progressiveness” in California or “Frenchness” under
Marine Le Pen. The Federalists’ primary concerns were the practical benefits of forming an
increased community, and they expressed this interest politically by emphasizing the importance
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of community as a good in itself. They did not stake its desirability to its measure of ideological
coherence, progressive or not.
In Federalist number sixty-two, Madison finds himself defending the equal representation
give to all state within the Senate. Critics found this institutional design bewildering in light of
their commitment to a “one man one vote” democracy in which “one person’s voting power
ought to be roughly equivalent to another person’s”12. Under Senate rules, voters in small states
have their influence amplified in the Senate, whereas voters in large states have theirs divided
amongst larger constituencies, decreasing their power. Why shouldn’t this commitment apply to
representation within the Senate? The Founders are charged with incoherence: formal they have
representative equality between citizen out the window in favor of a substantive representative
equality between unequal states. For his part, Madison explains that due to practical interests,
finding agreement, and building community, was more important than that community
expressing ideological coherence.
For Madison, a common government--replete with powers “equal to its objects”--is
“called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political situation, of America”(Hamilton et
al. 375). The nation calls for a unified government not as a token gesture, but in pursuit of gains
to be had through increased power. If the “object” of his statement is the thirteen states already
engaging in trade across their borders, the political power “equal to” it is the ability to regulate
this trade. The “voice” of the people clamor for political integration through their economic
actions--pursuing commerce and relations across borders. A legal framework is necessary to

12 Anonymous.

"One-person, One-vote Rule." LII / Legal Information Institute. Cornell University Law School, 19
Aug. 2010. Web. 02 May 2017.
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preserve this interstate commerce when disputes necessarily arise between traders or those
affected by traders’ activities.
Achieving unanimous agreement between states on the ratification of the Constitution
faced a hurdle by way of the “one man one vote” principle. Its complete application would
require smaller states to consent to signing away their sovereignty to a body in which their
interests would always find less representation than that of their fellows. Madison writes on the
topic that “A government founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger states
[i.e. one man, one vote] is not likely to be obtained from the smaller States” (Hamilton et al.
375). The Constitution’s drafters thus found themselves in a dilemma: remain ideologically
coherent and lose the membership of the smaller states, or achieve the creation of community,
compromising principles along the way. They chose the latter.
Madison describes the compromise over congressional representation as powered not by
“theory” but “a spirit of amity,” expressed in participants’ “mutual deference and
concession” (Hamilton et al. 375). In other words, community took precedence over coherence.
While the institutional structure is sub-optimal as viewed from each parties’ point of view--larger
states want proportionally equal representation, smaller states want substantively equal
representation--the fact that a common structure exists is better than none at all, or one only
encompassing some states. The decision to compromise on principle is the decision to embrace
the “lesser evil”: “The only option...lies between the proposed government and a government [or
lack thereof] still more objectionable” (Hamilton et al. 375). Tellingly, Madison deems this an act
of “prudence,” a word whose connotation of practicality reminds us that at the heart of the
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founder’s conviction is not a coherent ideological position, but a real-life hungering for the
economic benefits of community.

b. Hamilton
For the anti-Federalists, the incoherent position taken by the Constitution’s founders in order to
achieve unanimous support “only proves, that we cannot form one general government on equal
and just principles” and thus that “we ought not to lodge such extensive powers” within a central
government at all(Farmer 10). If a community cannot express coherence in its principles of
justice, they argue, then that community is unwarranted; community should only exist for the
sake of expressing a principle of justice. Though this is not the position held by the Founders, the
anti-Federalists can be excused for thinking it is; Hamilton himself provides evidence for their
claim.
The Constitution’s drafters, Hamilton writes, were to determine “whether societies of
men are capable...of establishing good government from reflection,” or whether they are slave to
“accident and force,” seemingly privileging theory and reflection over materiality and accident
(Hamilton et al. 27). He seems to be expressly endorsing the value of coherence above all else,
speaking as if coherence were the ultimate goal, and the founders the first humans to attempt to
achieve it by adopting poses of reflection. Thus it would seem that insofar as the Constitution
expresses incoherence he would consider it invalid as it goes against the fundamental ethos of its
drafters. However, Hamilton goes on to show that the reason being employed by the Founders
through “reflection” is not myopic, judging the rationality of each law by itself, but contextual,
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viewing the document as a whole in light of numerous reasons favoring the adoption of any
constitution at all.
He describes constitutional deliberators as having had “many particular interests” which
created “prejudices little favorable to... truth”(Hamilton et al. 27,28). If that were the case, and
coherence the ultimate goal, it would seem reasonable to exclude those biases which preclude the
attainment of truth, only taking into account those that do not. At the very least, others could
attempt to persuade those who are prejudiced of the errors of their ways. This position is taken
by the anti-Federalists, who only seek to “induce” the “sensible and virtuous part of the
community” to agree to their laws, suppressing resistance from the rest (Farmer 7). However,
Hamilton denounces this strategy on two grounds: the innocence of those who are biased, and the
inevitability of bias itself.
Of those who hold prejudiced positions in relation to the Constitution, Hamilton writes:
...much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from the
sources, blameless at least if not respectable--the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and
fears. So numerous indeed and powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we,
upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first
magnitude to society. (Hamilton et al. 28)(emphasis mine)

Here he is making two moves. First, he proclaims the innocence (“blameless...honest errors”) of
those who hold biased positions, making their exclusion by the anti-Federalists rather suspect.
Though we may attempt to show the biased their mistakes, it seems very anti-democratic to
dismiss a portion of the population for an action of which they are blameless. Second, he
problematizes the appearance of bias. If both “wise” and “good” men often fall prey themselves
to bias, how are we--the spectators--to conclude who is biased and who is not. Its like attempting
to bet on the results of a weightlifting competition and learning, during your inspection of the
participants, that muscles do not help one to lift weights. Our usual heuristics of judgment--
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wisdom means one is not prejudiced towards the truth, or muscularity means one can lift
weights--are no longer operative. While the weightlifting bettor may get around this problem by
betting randomly, Constitutional deliberators do ultimately need to decide whose plan to follow
and whose to ignore. Without the strict command of: follow these men, they are wise and thus
provide truth, deliberators are hard-pressed to discover the absolute truth on each and every
constitutional decision.
Thus we find that bias is both inevitable, blameless, and liable to befall even the most
honest of deliberators. In consequence, it is difficult to spot: its beholder is not marked by any
deficit that others do not share. With this in mind, it is clear that the Founders’ “reflection,”
which Hamilton refers to as guiding their deliberations, is directed towards the Constitution as a
whole, not each of its individual parts. Were it not, agreement on any single law would be close
to impossible; some would declare it truth, others falsity. Instead, deliberators’ reflections reveal
to them the rationality--in light of this ontological status of bias--of viewing the Constitution as a
whole. More than a set of rules for defining justice, it is a measure towards building community.
The benefits of community are simply too great, and the pursuit of truth too fraught, to think
otherwise. The question is not: “do each of the Constitution’s clauses expresses a uniform idea of
justice?” but rather “is the incoherence expressed within the Constitution’s idea of justice
devastating enough for us to forego the immense benefits of forming a common sovereign?” For
Hamilton and Madison, at least, reflection tells us “no.”

iv. Conclusion
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In this chapter, I argued against global movements towards devolution on three grounds. First, I
explained that movements away from globalization have to contend with the fact that their
political positions will almost certainly injure citizens’ economic well-being. Because of this
fact, I argue, devolution is unlikely to be carried out in practice, amounting to no more than a
token gesture and a catchy slogan. As an example, I pointed to the U.K.’s decision to sign a trade
agreement with the E.U. after its exit from the association. Attempting to retain their legitimacy,
they restrict the terms of trade to a minimal set of rules, leaving them unprepared to deal
politically with problems which arise such as externalities, disputes between traders, or citizen’s
ethical concerns. They are not any less entangled with other nations, just less prepared to deal
with the issues entanglement brings.
Second, I argued that devolution creates instability in two ways. For one, it sets a
precedent that individual interest in some good may override the common interest in remaining
unified politically. Once out of the bag, this cat is hard to stop. Thus Abraham Lincoln viewed
the South’s secession as not just an act of betrayal and an end to the American Union, but a step
towards the evaporation of democracy from the face of the earth. For another, devolution leaves
smaller political communities in its wake. Smaller communities, for both Aristotle and the
Federalists, are more liable to instability. For them, a nation is unable to retain stability when
only two factions exist: each will continually gain power only to use it to invade the rights of the
other, who previously did the same to them. Thus they urge the adoption of a larger state for, as
John Adams noted in his defense of the Constitution, “The United States of America calculated
their governments for a duration of more than ten years”(Adams 298).
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Finally, I showed that the Federalists expressed a preference for globalization by
affirming the primacy of forming community over achieving ideological coherence. This is
important because many present calls for devolution base their claims on a pursuit of coherence,
whether it be “progressiveness, “French-ness” or “America first-ness.” Faced with a choice
between upholding the principle of “one man one vote” or sacrificing this principle to gain the
consent of smaller states to be ruled, the Founders chose the latter. As they acknowledge, they
were not going to let “theory” get in the way of the “voice” of the people which called for a
dominant sovereign to regulate commerce between themselves. Unlike the Brits, who follow the
economic interests of their citizens in signing a free-trade deal with the E.U., while indulging
their political fantasies by foolishly relinquishing the power to coordinate in the regulation of this
international trade, the Founders acknowledged the practical interests of their people and set
about forming a reasonable political structure to further them.
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II. Pericles’ Payments

In the previous chapter, I ended by showing the American Founders’ commitment to community
over coherence; for them, the end of political deliberation is finding agreement, not expressing a
coherent ideal of justice. However, a devolutionist can short-circuit this argument by claiming
that if participants’ ideas of justice wildly diverge, any government they are capable of founding
will be ineffective for carrying out the will of the people--the people’s will will too confused.
For example, though the U.K. relinquished its ability to regulate international commerce
by leaving the E.U., perhaps that is better than the limited regulation it was able to influence as a
member of the E.U. In essence, the argument is that while forming community is economically
beneficial, those benefits can be minimal if the individuals forming community are too
ideologically diverse, creating stifled and ineffective governance.
However, as I will show, the Federalists encountered this claim as well, finding it
unconvincing. Both sides of the debate--the Federalists’ and their opposition--founnd support
from the work of Baron de Montesquieu, an influential political theorist of the time. However,
Montesquieu himself ultimately affirms that while ideological diversity can hinder the work of
governance, this hindrance can be overcome through increased communication. Through
vocalization, citizens’ diverse interests become objective, and thus able to be viewed
dispassionately alongside the vocalized interests of others. Communication makes each citizen
more able to alter their own interests in response to others’ by making clear to them their own
subjectivity; it is hard to maintain a notion of oneself as a sole purveyor of truth when
encountered with the truth as it is understood by other equally rational creatures. The solution to
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ideological diversity within a community, then, is not to disband that community for fear of
intransigent government, but to allow citizens a greater amount of political speech--thereby
pushing the community towards a more unified ideology and resulting effective governance.

i. Diversity Stifles Governance: Montesquieu’s Size Requirement
In a letter dated October eighteenth and addressed the to “Citizens of the State of New York,”
one writer employing the pen name Brutus cites French political theorist Baron de Montesquieu
to criticize the proposed Union for its unwieldy size. In the opinion of the “wisest men who have
ever thought,” he writes, “a free republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense
extent 13”(Brutus 8). For Montesquieu, the “interest of the public14” becomes increasingly opaque
as a nation grows in size. Accordingly, citizens feel their interests are at odds with those of their
compatriots: if an interest is not shared, it is in competition. They begin to feel they can
“raise...to grandeur on the ruins of [the] country,” a thought disastrous to any form of
government(Brutus 8). Furthermore, due to democracy’s reliance upon citizens’ ability to “all
come together to deliberate,” its authority must be restricted “to such bounds as that the people
can conveniently assemble”(Brutus 9). Thus he concludes it is not “practicable” for a country so
“large and numerous” as the United States to elect representatives which will “speak their
sentiments” without their number thereby becoming “so numerous as to be incapable of
transacting public business”(Brutus 10). “A free republic,” therefore, simply “cannot long
subsist” over a nation “of the great extent of these states”(Brutus 13).

13
14

“It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsists”(Montesquieu 124).

“In a large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends
on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more with the reach
of every citizen; abuses are of less extent”(Montesquieu 124).
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Responding to his detractors’ circulation of the “observations of Montesquieu on the
necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government,” Alexander Hamilton, writing
under the name Publius, finds two faults in their argumentation(Hamilton et al. 68). The first is
perspectival: for Montesquieu, the smallness “natural” to republican government was “of
dimensions far short[er than] the limits...of almost every one of the States” (Hamilton et al. 68).
To follow his logic, then, we would be forced to reject not only the Constitution, but the preexisting constitutions of each of the thirteen states-- surely not what Brutus had in mind. The
second is contextual. In the same work, The Spirit of the Laws, Hamilton notes, Montesquieu
states that in a confederate republic, where “several smaller states agree to become members of a
larger one,” the benefits of a democratic government can be reconciled with the executive
powers of a monarchy(Hamilton et al. 69). This arrangement preserves the representation of a
republican government 15, while allowing the sovereign--through creation of a centralized
executive---to act, when necessary, swiftly and as one16. He concludes that Brutus fails to
accurately represent Montesquieu, instead providing his own “novel refinements to an erroneous
theory”(Hamilton et al. 71). Consequently, Brutus fails to prove the alleged necessity of rejecting
the proposed constitution (Hamilton et al. 71).
While Hamilton successfully shows that Montesquieu’s size requirement is irrelevant to
the question at issue, he fails to address a more pressing claim upon which his opposition is
rooted. This is the claim that as a nation grows beyond its original bounds, it becomes more and
more difficult to discern what is in its “public interest.” A legislature composed of representatives
15

“The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent
parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representative in the Senate”(Hamilton et al. 71).
16

“‘[A confederate republic] is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by
means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the
united body”’(Hamilton et al. 69).

25

whose “manners and habits differ as much as their climates and productions,” anti-Federalists
argue, is run by such “heterogeneous and discordant principles” as to render it ineffectual(Brutus
10). Rather than pursuing common goals, legislators would be “constantly contending with each
other”(Brutus 10). This claim finds familiar support: Montesquieu remarks that as the “character
of the spirit and the passions of the heart [of men]” differ according to climate, so too should
laws ”be relative to the[se] differences”(Montesquieu 231). Though a centralized government
does possess the advantages of monarchy in expanding its territory and providing for defense, it
is still threatened with a loss of authority as it incorporates new lands and peoples whose ways of
life differ from those expressed in the state’s pre-existing laws. Too much diversity in
incorporation, and the citizenry loses that shared sense of goodness which allowed it to function
effectively.

ii. Aristotle’s Positive Feedback Loop of Democracy
Montesquieu’s conviction that a state must express a coherent ideal of goodness to function is
found in Aristotle. “A state exists,” he wrote in his Politics “for the sake of a good life, and not
for the sake of life only”(Aristotle 73). For him, the state is not only a negative set of restrictions
upon its peoples, but a positive force working towards bringing about the ideals embodied in
their state. For example, Sparta makes its citizens war-like, Athens makes them political. Without
an ideal to pursue, a state becomes a “mere society,” the same as that which “slaves and brute
animals might form”(Aristotle 74,73). Man’s unique ability to reason, and thereby form notions
of the ideal, means his society need not only work towards his survival--as any collective of
animals would do--but also towards his ideal of justice.
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With this consideration in mind--the necessity of ideological consensus among citizens
for the state to express a coherent ideal and become more than a mere association--Aristotle
argues that “such a community can only be established among those who live in the same place,”
and attend “amusements which draw men together”(Aristotle 74-75). For him, intercourse and
the feelings of mutual concern it instantiates between citizens is a necessary component of
finding mutual interests and founding a political society. Unlike Montesquieu, however, he
provides no express restriction on the society’s eventual size after this establishment. In fact, he
assumes a well-run state will outgrow its humble, community-based beginnings and become
something larger--as is to be expected from the man who believes the “end of a thing is the
best”(Aristotle 13). The successful political society, once forged out of familial bonds, outgrows
these fetters to become self-sufficing, relying upon no other contingent facts--such as citizens’
location--besides its own existence: “to be self-sufficing is the end and the best”(Aristotle 13).
Democratic community becomes detached from its progenitor, mutual ideology, to become a
self-sufficient creator of its own mutually-held ideology.
This enlarged state, however, which has “outgrown [its] original size” and had its
“revenues...increased,” does not maintain its sense of community by accident: “out of...necessary
causes,” it shifts its administrative form to a new “kind of democracy”(Aristotle101). Aristotle
explains:
“...when cities have far outgrown their original size, and their revenues have increased, all the citizens have a place
in the government, through the great preponderance of the multitude; and they all, including the poor who receive
pay, and therefore have leisure to exercise their rights, share in the administration.”(Aristotle101)(emphasis mine)

The enriched state compensates for an increased diversity of peoples and interests by paying
those peoples to speak for themselves, “exercising their rights” to share their interests in pursuit
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of favorable administration. It puts some of the practical gains had from globalization towards
easing the ideological dissension which globalization has brought along with them. This process
I will term the positive feedback loop of democracy: as the state grows in size and wealth due to
its pre-existing unified conception of goodness and resultant effective governance, it loses that
sense of community upon which that particular idea of goodness was forged. At the same time, it
uses this increased wealth, providing payments to the poor for civic duty, to form a larger more
inclusive political community which, Aristotle implies, will coalesce around its own newfound
sense of goodness.
Aristotle is referring specifically to Athens under the reign Pericles, during which time
payment for civil service and attendance at the Assembly was instituted. According to one
historian, “no single other reform furthered democracy as much as pay for service”17. Under this
system, not only was every citizen formally able to attend the Assembly, but all--because they
were receiving pay for doing so--had a substantive freedom to do so. Furthermore the Assembly,
recognized no system of seniority: all citizens could speak, provided they were not subsequently
shouted down by the multitude.
Aristotle himself endorses this move to a fully-enfranchised political society, describing it
as the “latest in the history of states”(Aristotle 101)(emphasis mine). Given his commitment to
telos--”the end of a thing is the best”--it is clear that for him the last, or latest, form of a thing
must be its very best. Also, while discussing various forms of democracy, he states that “a
council is the most democratic when there is not the means of paying all the citizens,” implying
that payment for citizens, when the means exist, is the most democratic form of government

17Bailly,

Jacques A. "Athenian Democracy." Athenian Democracy. University of Vermont, n.d. Web. 02 May 2017.
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(Aristotle 154)(emphasis mine). Finally, in his history of The Constitutions of Athens, Aristotle
describes the effect of the discontinuation of these payments for the citizenry: oligarchy. He
recounts that when Athenians became convinced Persia would be more likely to form an alliance
if they were under oligarchic rule, they elected the council of “the four hundred,” whose first law
was that “nobody was to receive pay for any office”(Aristotle 233). Effectively limiting the role
of governing to men of excess wealth, this law established rule by the wealthy. Avoiding debate
on the relative merits of democracy versus oligarchy, it is clear that if one is committed to
democracy, payment for citizen’s public participation is the best way to ensure its continued
existence.
To briefly recap, prior the ratification of the Constitution, a debate occurred between its
supporters and detractors on the possibility of the proposed democratic governance being
effective over such a large and diverse territory. Those opposed to integration, Brutus and the
anti-Federalists, cited Montesquieu, whose ideas on the topic derived from an Aristotelian
principle: for the state to exist legitimately, it requires a shared conception of the good among its
inhabitants. This allows it to express this ideal legislatively in a coherent set of laws promoting
the good life as it is thus defined. Given the diversity of both modes of life and of opinion to be
found within the thirteen states, they argue, reconciliation under one Union is unwise: diverse
opinions create a conflicted, and therefore stifled legislature, detracting from any benefits
globalization may bring.
However, we have found that Aristotle not only provided for, but encouraged, a
democratic state’s expansion over new and diverse territories. Putting some of the funds accruing
to it as a result of expansion towards paying citizens to participate civically, the expanded state
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enlarges its pool of representatives, vocalizing their diverse interests. In doing so, it ensures that
an increased diversity of opinions will not necessarily lead to legislative gridlock; providing
financially for their representation, the state brings newly encompassed interests into
consideration, eventually coalescing into a new, shared conception of the good.

iii. Communication Breeds Coherence
It is appropriate to ask exactly how a larger, more diverse body of representatives is supposed to
coalesce around a unified idea of good. After all, Brutus did consider the possibility of increased
representation, finding it “too numerous to act with any care”(Brutus 10). The difficulty for
Brutus is not the sheer size of the representative body, but the diversity of opinions held therein.
Were the latter to decrease, the former would cease to be an impediment. This can be seen from
the fact that, should groups of representatives agree upon certain principles amongst themselves,
they could act as a representative microcosm wherein fewer representatives speak for the
interests of the many, who then agree to support them.
The problem is one of reason-responsive change: if deliberators are unable to modify
their desires in response to those expressed by others, they will remain a “heterogeneous” and
“discordant” bunch. Conversely, if they are willing to modify their desires, a common solution
can be found: like a negotiation, the actors begin on opposite sides and gradually come together.
This would effectively create a smaller, more manageable representative body because there
would be fewer diverse interests to be represented. For Montesquieu, the answer is
communication: “the more communicative [a] peoples are,” he writes, “the more easily they
change their manners”(Montesquieu 311). Through witnessing one another, individuals are more
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able to recognize the particularity of their own desires: “because each man is...a spectacle for
another...one sees the singularities of individuals better. The climate that makes a nation like to
communicate also makes it like to change”(Montesquieu 311). By communicating, individuals
are forced to confront the fact that their own good is not yet an objective good capable of
founding a state. Thus it requires modification--in response to others’ good-- for it to become so.
If Montesquieu is correct, Aristotle’s extension of the deliberative body is itself enough to
provide for the conception of a new, more inclusive good in response to a new, more inclusive
state. The means by which representation is increased--payments providing citizens the leisure to
attend debate--simultaneously engenders increased communication by placing citizens within a
common space--the Assembly--and within earshot of one another. Attendance at political
discussion thus replaces what was for Aristotle once the function of “amusements”: establishing
community 18. With this in mind, we can expand our model of the positive feedback loop of
democracy. As the state grows in size, and correspondingly wealth, it puts some of that wealth
towards providing citizens the leisure to partake in political deliberation. As the number of
deliberators grows, the various conceptions of the good held by members of the state become,
through their verbal presentation, increasingly evident to the deliberative body, making them
available for incorporation into the common good. All that is required from citizens themselves
is a commitment to avoiding the community’s splintering, adopting a position of flexibility
towards their own interests in response to others’.This should be forthcoming irrespective of a
commitment to democratic community, because--as both Aristotle and Nayan Chanda mention-globalization is always in the citizenries’ economic best interest.

18

(Aristotle 74-75)
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iv. Benefits of Increased Enfranchisement
Aristotle viewed Pericles’ increased enfranchisement positively for other reasons as well. This
can be gleaned from his Politics. He writes, for example, that “true forms of government” are
those which govern according “to the common interest,” opposing this to the private interest,
“whether of the one, of the few, or the many”(Aristotle 71). A government, to be legitimate, must
prior to acting discern those interests which are common to its citizens. Contemporary political
theorists Josh Cohen and Archon Fung share this conviction, writing that in “a deliberative
democracy...laws and policies result from processes in which citizens defend solutions to
common problems on the basis of what are generally acknowledged as relevant reasons”(Cohen
and Fung 4)(emphasis mine). This is contrasted with popular problems that affect the majority,
but not the whole. While commonality seems to be an impossibly high bar to set for an issue to
become available for political discussion, we should keep in mind that an interest need not be
directly had by all citizens, but that citizens need only have an interest in someone whom that
interest does affect. In contemporary culture, this amounts to just about everyone for, as Philip
Kitcher notes, “given the technological possibilities for violent retaliation now increasingly
available to the poor and oppressed,” it becomes in the interest of all to to satisfy the rights of
marginalized groups(Buchanan and Powell 17). Placing citizens within a common space, a la a
Periclean assembly, does the exact same thing: when all citizens have the ability to invade one
another’s personal space with speech or action, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to ignore
their concerns. Attempting to assuage these concerns through negotiation thus becomes the
optimal route of action because ignorance is no longer an option.
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Clearly, this awareness of what is a common interest cannot be performed a priori, but
requires knowledge of all citizens’ actual desires; hence the distinction between the many and the
common--government cannot appeal to a utilitarian logic. By aiding the citizenry in the
expression of their desires, increasing their political speech, Aristotle makes this task of
discerning what is common easier. Further, finding a commonality of interests can have practical,
strategic benefits for society as a whole. Discussing the arts, Aristotle claims that “the many are
better judges [of merit] than a single man.” While “some understand one part, and some
another,” through combination they are able to “understand the whole”. Whether this principle
applies to democracy, he admits, “is not clear,” but contingent upon the make-up of the
deliberative body assembled. Contemporary democrats Cohen and Fung agree, noting that
“some radical democrats argue that a more participatory and deliberative democracy would be
better at solving practical problems,” concluding that “nothing [they] say is intended to dispute
this proposition about practical advantages” (Cohen and Fung 2). Regardless, to the “mass of
freemen” must be accorded “some deliberative and judicial functions” in order to avoid
dissension: “a state in which many poor men are excluded from office will necessarily be full of
enemies”(Aristotle 76-77). Thus universal enfranchisement provides two practical benefits, one
certain and one probable. By including the masses in deliberation, it helps gain their
acquiescence to any subsequent exercise of power, diminishing dissension. Simultaneously, by
increasing the quantity of political speech, it offers the possibility of better political solutions,
just as “a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single
purse”(Aristotle 76).
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v. Conclusion
The anti-Federalists, fretting over Montesquieu’s concern that a proposed Union would be too
vast for a democratic constitution, fail to pay heed to this idea’s progenitor--Aristotle. Had they
done so, they would have discovered two responses to their worry. First, although a democratic
government initially arises from communal bonds and mutual feeling, it is natural--and indeed
beneficial--that it outgrow these bonds to encompass a greater amount of land and people. This is
in line with Aristotle’s belief in telos: through the expansion of successful states and the
contraction of failed ones, the map is redrawn. Second, the dissension that threatens a
democracy during its attempt to expand can be remedied through administrative reform:
providing citizens with the leisure necessary to perform political speech attacks both the social
and political causes of unrest. Socially, it eases tension by preventing the poor from becoming
“enemies” of the state through their inclusion in the state apparatus. Politically, it makes it easier
to discern the common good, allowing a state, in Aristotelian terms, to be formed.
Returning to our initial discussion on devolution, its proponents have been defeated once
again. Whereas I previously showed that devolution is undesirable, here I showed that
devolutionists’ primary concern--that their current governing structure is too ideologically
diverse to represent their interests effectively--can be remedied by increasing political speech.
Further, this method is endorsed by Aristotle, whose idea of the state aligns with devolutionists’
in that it begins with ideological coherence. Unlike devolutionists, however, Aristotle recognizes
the benefits of territorial expansion; instead of political deconstruction, he encourages states
follow the lead of Pericles and institute payment for civil service. By doing so, Pericles was able
to maintain unity during periods of increased diversity, capitalizing on globalization’s economic
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benefits to do so. Thus, given the clear undesirability of devolution, the question becomes: how
can Pericles’ Assembly--and the ideological coherence it brings about-- possibly be realized in
modern-day America?
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III. Social Media and the Athenian Assembly

Thus far I have shown that devolution is undesirable for its practical as well as its ideological
consequences. While its proponents value coherence of ideology over the formation of
community, this position has been expressly denounced by thinkers in a tradition from Aristotle
to the Founders of the American republic. Furthermore, I showed that the increased ideological
diversity which results from globalization, and which threatens to render democratic governance
ineffective--a worry underlying devolutionist’s concerns--can be remedied through a positive
feedback loop of democracy. Under this method, some of the financial gains from globalization
are put towards paying citizens to perform civil service. This increases the overall amount of
political speech, and makes objective the interests of each constituent in society. This in turn
places citizens in a more flexible mindset; aware of their own subjectivity, they do not see
themselves as rigidly representing absolute truth.
However, if we are to take Aristotle’s positive feedback loop seriously as a means toward
remedying broad political disagreement, we must find a way to make operative Pericles’
Athenian Assembly for the modern age. Not every aspect must be identical--members need not
wear togas and sandals--but there are certain aspects which are vital to its functioning as a means
toward solving disputes.
Specifically, if the end of the positive feedback loop is to include the voices of
marginalized groups in a communal brokering of interests, then the modern assembly must meet
two requirements naturally following from this end. First, it must be open to all to both attend
and speak; we are seeking common, not popular, ground. Second, individuals must be able to
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trade responses with their peers in order to learn in which direction to pivot ideologically to
achieve greater commonality. In the Periclean Assembly for example, while all were allowed to
speak, the duration of this speech depended upon its reception by ones peers; if the speech was
unpopular, the speaker would be jeered until they stopped. In combination, these criteria allow
for two-way communication to occur between all members of society. This paves the way for
realization of one’s own subjectivity and subsequent concession of personal interest to the
interests of others, slowly bringing about ideological coherence.
As I will show, social media can provide the platform for this type of discussion. It is
formally free to all, and attendance could be made possible--just like in the Assembly--by a
governmental provision of income allowing individuals the necessary leisure to partake.
Furthermore, social media allows the kind of back-and-forth between one’s peers and oneself in
the form of shares, likes, reposts, retweets, etc. All of these are ways of indicating one’s support
or disapproval of a statement made by another, much like the cheers or boos heard within the
Assembly. Thus the contemporary analog to Pericles’ payment for civil service is payment for
social media usage.
In this chapter I will provide support for the claims made above regarding social media’s
ability to function as an Assembly. Then I will provide a specific example of social media
engendering an ethical change within society which resulted in political action. In doing so I
hope to show not only that social media is comparable to the Assembly, but that social media-regardless of this comparison--has proven itself capable already of bringing about greater
ideological agreement and subsequent political change within the United States.
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i. Social Media as Athenian Assembly
a. Usage
During oral arguments on the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute banning sex offenders
from using social media, Justice Anthony Kennedy said that social media sites have
a “utility” and “coverage” which is “greater than the communication you could ever have had,
even in the paradigm of the public square”19. Meanwhile Justice Kagan noted their political
import, stating that because every member of Congress has a Twitter, the platform is a “crucially
important channel of political communication.” Thus it seems even the nation’s highest court
shares my conviction that social media is the best analog to the Athenian Assembly as a place to
meet for political dialogue. However, let’s look more closely into the specifics of its workings.
Social media use is widespread, and is only likely to become more so. From 2005 to
2015, usage increased across all American adults from 7% to 65% 20. A majority of
Americans--62%--reported in 2016 to be getting their news from social media, an increase from
49% in 201221. One poll--albeit of only 1,000 workers--found that 67% regularly checking social
media even while at work22. Further, what happens on social media--much like the Assembly-doesn’t stay on social media, one Pew poll finds that:

19

"Packingham v. North Carolina." The Supreme Court 1194th ser. No..15 (2017): n. pag. Alderson Reporting
Company, 27 Feb. 2017. Web.
20

Perrin, Andrew. "Social Media Usage: 2005-2015." Pew Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech. Pew
Research Center, 08 Oct. 2015. Web. 02 May 2017.
21

Gottfried, Jeffrey, and Elisa Shearer. "News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016." Pew Research Center's
Journalism Project. Pew Research Center, 26 May 2016. Web. 02 May 2017.
Nanji, Ayaz. "How Much Time Do Employees Spend on Social Media at Work?"MarketingProfs. MarketingProfs
LLC., 29 Sept. 2016. Web. 02 May 2017.
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Some 14% of workers have found information on social media that has improved their professional opinion of a
colleague; at the same time, a similar share (16%) have found information on social media that has lowered their
professional opinion of a colleague23 .

Thus, social media is widely used (even when not permitted, e.g. at work) for both consumption
(getting news) and production (providing information). Furthermore, its effects do not remain
within the bounds of social media, but overflow into personal life.
However, also like the Assembly prior to Pericles, social media usage remains skewed
towards the privileged even amongst internet users. Pew finds:
Over the past decade, it has consistently been the case that those in higher-income households were more likely to
use social media...Turning to educational attainment, a similar pattern is observed. Those with at least some college
experience have been consistently more likely than those with a high school degree or less to use social media over
the past decade. 24

Even while social media usage increases for all, lower-income and less-educated individuals
remain left out of the conversation. Coincidentally, less-educated individuals split heavily
towards the devolution-favoring Donald Trump. Perhaps this indicates that their absence from
social media did in fact lead to communal ignorance of their interests, leading them to seek
separation from the sovereign structure. Regardless, the solution is the same as it was for
Pericles: provide leisure through payment. While in Athens they had to ensure each individual
arrived at the Assembly, only receiving their payment upon doing, we can assume--if the last
decades’ growth is any indication--that individuals will drive themselves to social media when
given the leisure to do so. Once there, however, how do they behave?

Olmstead, Kenneth, Cliﬀ Lampe, and Nicole B. Ellison. "Social Media and the Workplace."Pew
Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech. Pew Research Center, 22 June 2016. Web. 02 May 2017.
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b. Possibilities for Dialogue
In a study of self-creation on the internet, Toshi Takahashi reproduces the following quote:
“Today, without a feel of the social environment (kuuki) or how others may think, it is difficult to be sure if one is
going the right direction....So, one is always trying to connect with others on social media such as Facebook and
Mixi, and one is always bothered about the number of followers one has on Twitter. “Does anyone recognize me?
And do others see me as a valuable person, one who has friends around?” Thus he or she cannot help but care about
recognition from others” (Takahashi 50).”(emphasis mine)

He goes on explain the mechanism by which this “recognition” occurs:
While the number of comments or “likes” young people receive shows recognition from others, some people view
the comments or “likes” that they make on other’s social media content as a form of self-expression and proof of
self-existence. (Takahashi 48)

He concludes that individuals growing up in the digital age undergo a mutual, global process of
recognition and “self-actualization” through the “reinforce[ment] of intimacy” with others via
digital platforms (Takahashi 49).
While we need not share Takahashi’s optimism regarding social media’s effects on
promoting self-actualization, his account points us towards what makes the platform ideal as a
space for deliberation. First, it prompts individuals to express themselves in an attempt to gain
recognition. He quotes one young student who admits: “I guess I use [social media] as a way of
reminding people that I exist”(Takahashi 47). Like attendees at the Assembly, this student refuses
to be ignored, posting until he is heard: “I do want to stand out in a way... not by what I post but
by who I post it to and how often”(Takahashi 47). Further, social media provides not just for
immediate self-expression, but an active back-and-forth. Sharing one’s opinion of another’s selfexpression is seen as just as valuable a form of self-expression as sharing one’s own. Our student
for example, searching for recognition, admits he makes “maybe five or ten comments a day.
Well not even comments, you can also just press like”(Takahashi 47).
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These prevalence on social media of these processes--self-expression through speech and
self-expression as opinion upon another’s speech--render it effective for replicating the kind of
dialogue found in the Assembly. While all can speak, some may be silenced, others promoted, by
the reaction of the crowd. In turn, those seeking recognition may alter their speech to accord
better with the wishes of the populace. However, it is unlikely that in doing so they will lie or
promote beliefs they do not hold because, as our interviewee notes, they seek recognition as
whom they believe themselves to be: “this,” he says of his social media profile “is the image I
want to give people” (Takahashi 47). It is unlikely blatant dishonesty would be a part of
anyone’s ideal self-image.
c. Cohesion
We still need to answer how this global interaction of back-and-forth speech and opinion is
supposed to bring about the type of ethical change demanded by the need for ideological
coherence. Following Montesquieu, it is once again a question of an individual’s gaining
awareness, paying “witness” to another. By recognizing the other, along with the political and
economic ties that bind one to the other, one is forced to confront the interests of the other,
providing the grounds for a process of mutual concession. So we ask: does social media allow
one to confront “the other”?
In the same paper, Takahashi describes social media’s ability to introduce one to cultural
novelties:
With social media, young people seek and receive information, images, and cultural values which may be different
from those prevalent in their country or region. The Internet and digital media give them alternative social and
cultural values that make it possible for them to create a new identity in the global world. (Takahashi 49,50)
(emphasis mine)
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Through its total inclusiveness, social media allows individuals to “witness” cultures with values
much different than their own. Kathleen Yancey describes this process of witnessing as
“mak[ing] the familiar strange,” a process able to dismantle “entrenched and unproductive
pedagogical thinking”(Yancey 8). Her formulation is similar to Montesquieu’s: “because each
man is...a spectacle for another...one sees the singularities of individuals better”(Montesquieu
311). Both understand the presence of the “other” as a force leading the individual to confront
their own singularity. Furthermore, both see recognition of one’s own singularity as a necessary
precursor to modifying one’s entrenched values. Because social media provides this
objectification of heretofore unheard interests, presenting them directly to one’s fellow digital
citizens, it too makes “the familiar strange.” It forces one to confront the “other,” allowing the
forging of a “new identity” in response.
Furthermore, evidence suggests that social media may actually be more effective at
revealing the “other” than the Assembly ever could have been: one’s search for the “other” on
social media may have a neurological basis both encouraging and promoting a depth of
understanding of the “other”. Thomas Parsons writes in his book Cyberpsychology and the Brain
that:
Internet searches reflect the ‘seeking’ circuity described by the affective neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp. Our brains
have evolved to seek out our environments for information that will help us survive....Dopamine is released each
time one explores his or her environment. Interestingly, the dopaminergic-induced sense of euphoria we experience
is typically not just a product of a reward, but of seeking itself. For example, a person could decide to do a quick
Google search to find out what the Japanese word “otaku” means only to find an hour later that one’s quick search
has lead to an hour of Googling(Parsons 84).

Science aside, the experience of obsessive googling is something we can all probably identify
with. Importantly, Parsons evokes the idea of a discovered “environment” surrounding the initial
search. What follows from that search is not randomness, but a discovery of context; there is
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always a causal chain at work. While this claim is trivial in that it only implies the existence of a
search history, we can infer further meaning into it with one reasonable assumption. Specifically,
web pages one click away from each other--those likely to bring about a prolonged searching
binge-- are likely have some bearing on each other. If so, as one continuously clicks these links,
the information which piles up in the form of web pages provides context for one’s initial click.
As such, Parson’s example continues:
While it only took us a minute to find out that “otaku” is a Japanese term for persons with obsessive interests-regularly anime and manga fandom--it leads to an hour of dopamine-charged searching for information about its
contemporary usage, its origination with Akio Nakamori’s essay in Manga Burriko, then to Haruki Murakami’s
Norwegian Wood, next to the Beatles, then to Thomas Mann’s Magic Mountain, and so on (Parsons 84).

Setting out in pursuit of a simple definition, our protagonist returns with an informal history in
hand. Notice the import of the information discovered, providing both modern context (its
“contemporary usage”) and historical significance (“origination”) as well as a group of cultural
works in which the object of our search can be found.
Thus users do actively seek out the “other” on social media. As Takahashi explains, and
many of us know, information on the web comes from all corners of the earth. Just by not
purposefully avoiding it, one is certain to come into contact with foreign cultures while surfing
the net. Further, this knowledge gained of the “other” through social media is not superficial--or
it need not be--deepening our understanding of their interests and desires. Panksepp contends
that the very act of searching itself sets in motion further searches as the brain seeks a release of
dopamine. Because web pages which are linked--allowing the viewer to surf easily from one to
the other--are likely to be relevant to one another, surfing by its very nature provides context to
our initial search.

43

ii. Social Media in Action
Having shown theoretical promise, I will now explore social media’s concrete ability to bring
about modifications to the common good. To do so, I employ the framework for ethical change
outlined by Philip Kitcher in his book The Ethical Project. Specifically, I utilize his concepts
concerning proper ethical deliberation to analyze a case study of political change wrought by
social media: the retirement of Confederate flags outside the South Carolina statehouse. I will
conclude that social media is an improvement in ethical deliberation due to its ability to present
facts and mirror opinions: it confronts the entire community with shared facts, as well as other’s
opinions, and others’ opinions on those opinions.
Kitcher’s method is appropriate because of its reliance upon ethical progress as opposed
to truth25. As I previously noted, it is the notion of a singular, fixed truth which leads
devolutionists to favor political isolation over integration. This avoidance of mutual concession
is a position I hope to avoid. Kitcher’s own position stems from his understanding of ethics as a
social mechanism meant to provide practical benefits to the community at large: the “original
function of ethics” he writes, “is to remedy those altruism failures provoking social
conflict”(Kitcher 223). His understanding parallels that of Aristotle who sees notions of the good
as underlying a legitimate state. Under both practices, a continuously modified notion of
goodness undergirds a thereby functioning, rather than conflict-ridden, community.
Kitcher defines progressive ethical change as a move to a code which “contains precepts
enjoining altruism of wider scope or greater range than the code it replaces”(Kitcher 215). By
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regressive”(Kitcher 210).
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altruism Kitcher means taking into account, and responding positively to, the interests of others.
Presumably this is the kind of change that is needed for the positive feedback loop of democracy
to work; it must allow wider swaths of individuals to feel included within the community by way
of recognizing and responding to their ethical concerns. Thus, Kitcher’s use of wider as opposed
to better (he explicitly rejects concerns for Darwinian fitness26) provides the perfect blueprint for
a method of ethical deliberation which does not rely entirely upon pre-conceived notions of
goodness, for doing so would foreclose the possibility of enlarging democratic community. It is
instead highly malleable and responsive to the voices of participants, voices which are promoted
through the positive feedback loop.
Under this system, validity of any ethical change must be measured against the validity of
the process leading to that change. An ideal ethical deliberation, Kitcher argues, takes place
under conditions of “mutual engagement,” which requires certain stances among its
participants(Kitcher 343). Among these conditions, two are particularly important:

1. (KE) In their deliberations, the participants do not rely on any false beliefs about the natural world.
2. (KW) Each participant has complete knowledge of the wishes of others, and of the ways in which these wishes
are modified through the course of their interactions with one another.
(Kitcher 345)

While the first ensures that deliberators are discussing the same object, the latter ensures that
their ideas are pliable--as per Montesquieu--in response to communication with others.
Combined, they provide necessary and sufficient requirements for ethical exchanges to occur
within a deliberative space.

26

“Progressive transitions are not to be identified with those promoting Darwinian or cultural success”(Kitcher 213).
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a. The Dylann Roof Case
To discuss the interactions that make up a social network, I will borrow the term “social
organism” from Oliver Luckett (Luckett and Casey). This “organism” is not restricted to
traditional heavyweights--Twitter, Facebook, Instagram--but covers any arena where messages
are exchanged, including chatrooms, message boards, and text boxes that appear alongside other
media. He calls this an organism to emphasize its similarity to other forms of life: through
evolutionary fitness, its appearance is constantly in flux. Further, through the social network, he
contends, the evolutionary fitness of ideas is rapidly put to the test, constantly reforming our
ideological landscape. This landscape is then reflected back and objectified in that social
network. In a powerful example, Luckett highlights the aftermath of Dylan Roof’s attack on a
Bible study group in Charleston, South Carolina.
Despite “growing recognition...that the symbol is offensive to many Americans,”27 the
Confederate flag has for decades flown outside seven southern state capitols.28 In 2010 it was
estimated one-third of the African-American community lived under a confederate state flag.29
Contestation of the issue has not been lacking--a Google search for “fights over confederate flag”
will bring up such titles as “Fight over Confederate flag ends in criminal charges”, “Fla. man
struck by wife in fight over confederate flag”, “Brawl Breaks Out in Front of SC Statehouse
Over Confederate Flag”, and a BBC article entitled “Why do people still fly the Confederate
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flag” penned two years prior to the massacre--yet political action had only maintained the status
quo, as it is sometimes wont to do.
After news broke of Roof’s crime, along with the discovery of pictures of Roof holding a
Confederate Flag, the absence of attention which had allowed political movement to stall was no
longer available. We can only speculate as to why Roof’s crime went viral but, following
Luckett’s biological metaphor, it was most likely because the story itself perfectly fit welldeveloped news “receptors.” That is, it contained two storylines--racism and mass shootings-which have become “familiar enough to be comprehensible...within cultural comfort
zones”(Luckett and Casey 99). In the era of Sandy Hook and Black Lives Matter, a misguided
white youth firing rounds into a crowd of unsuspecting African-Americans serves only to
continue, not alter, the narrative. Such conformity, found in stories or ideas which allow their
consumer to remain within pre-existing social mores, is one feature Luckett identifies as favoring
chances of replication, increasing its evolutionary fitness(Luckett and Casey 99).
Another boon to a stories’ reproducibility, as Takahashi predicted, is its novelty (Luckett
and Casey 99). To become a successful meme [a heuristic containing information spread
throughout the web], a story must not only have “coherence with a host’s preexisting cognitive
framework,” achieved through conformity, but must offer something unique to catch viewer’s
attention(Luckett and Casey 99). By combining two previously distinct issues, namely the
availability of firearms and the prevalence of racism, this story did just that, taking proven
ingredients and putting them together in a distinct way. In doing so, it was able to provide moral
indignation to one’s own living room.
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What is the upside to all this? What is the import of a murderous teenage racist becoming
notable enough to warrant a CNN article asking “Who is Dylann Roof”?30 As I noted, his crime
took place within an environment--South Carolina--which served as the grounds of an ongoing
dispute regarding the statehouses’ bearing of the confederate flag. Less than one month after the
shooting however, that flag came down, ending a fifty-four year run outside the capitol. Despite
prompting a thirteen-hour debate in the House, final vote tallies were overwhelming: 37-3 in the
Senate and 103-10 in the House for its removal31 32 . Ideological coherence was beginning to
form. State Senator Vincent Sheheen explains the relation between the murder and the
legislature’s change of heart:
"When we vote for this bill to remove the flag it won't be because of what happened a couple of weeks ago. But
what happened a couple of weeks ago opened the eyes of many people in this chamber and many people in this
state.”33

Many other politicians involved echo that they had their eyes opened. Thus they claim the
connection between the Confederate flag and racism is a new phenomena. To wit Sen. Joel
Lourie explains the flag removal as a response its being “used...as a a symbol of hatred and
bigotry” by the “alleged killer of the Charleston nine,” speaking as if it hadn’t been used as such
before34 . Similarly, speaking to the WSJ, a Baptist priest Bill Feus expresses ambivalence
towards the removal, admitting he “understand[s]...the Confederate flag has been hijacked by
30
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hate groups...but it also represents the flag my kin fought and died under”35 . Once again, the
decision to remove the flag is a response to a new fact, that the flag has been hijacked, and not a
change of heart on the part of the legislature. Had they been alerted to this fact earlier, it is
implied, they would have removed it then. Thus they claim ignorance of a long-standing issue,
making their politicsl action appear an urgent response to an emerging problem.
However, as Naomi Shavin of the New Republic notes, “This is an impossible case to
make”36. Not only is the flag one of only three used by the Ku Klux Klan, but its recurrent
popular emergence seems to coincide with “challenges...[to the] white supremacist way of life.”
For example, the flag was first raised over Southern statehouses in the 50’s and 60’s, during
desegregation and the Civil Rights movement. The possibility that the flag then continued to fly
for decades due solely to support from white supremacist groups is not so remote when
considering that according to Euan Hague, a Confederate commemoration scholar at DePaul,
neo-Confederates “are far from a ‘fringe group’ and in fact have significant support among
Whites in the South”37. If this is the case, it lends support to the sentiment expressed by social
worker Yvonne Pygatt to the Washington Post: “This is a proud moment,” she says, “but
this...should have happened a long time ago.”38 For her, this indeed was a change of heart and
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not of facts. The legislature, willfully ignoring the problem for decades, only relented under the
condemning glare of the nation as objectified in social media.

b. Return to Kitcher
How can we make sense of this change from a Kitcherian point of view? Presumably, the change
is progressive: it responds to the ongoing ethical concerns of minorities living under a
confederate flag, while not overstepping the ethical concerns of those who previously supported
the flag: as they contend, the awareness that the flag was connected to a hate group forced them
to change their position to one in support of its removal. Thus, the circle of altruism expands,
without contraction. But how did social media do this?
First, it ensured (KE): that the object of deliberation was the same for both parties.
Previously, the Confederate flag was understood by one group as a sign of hatred, and another as
a sign of heritage. While the latter may be accused of willful ignorance, there is no evidence to
support the claim. With the viral spread of the images of Roof alongside a Confederate flag,
however, willful ignorance can be alleged if they continue to hold onto their conception of the
flag as a purely historical object. Senator Lourie, in being confronted with this possibility,
acknowledges the status of the flag as a hate symbol, though is sure to add that it is only the
images of Roof that alerted him to this fact. Otherwise, he implies, he assuredly would have
advocated its retirement earlier. Thus, the images connecting racism-fueled Roof to the
Confederate flag made sure that those who deny a connection between the two can be accused of
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“rely[ing]” upon “false beliefs about the natural world”--a status no sane politician or citizen
would hope to portray--alternative facts notwithstanding39 .
Secondly, social media promoted (KW): knowledge of the wishes of others, and how
those wishes are modified through their interaction with others’ wishes. This is achieved through
what Kitcher calls “extended mirroring,” akin to the back-and-forth action of the Assembly
which I noted earlier. A, for example, becomes aware not only of B’s desires, but of C’s
assessment of B’s desires, and D’s assessment of C’s assessment of B’s desires and so on and so
forth (Kitcher 347). When a piece of speech is widely supported or condemned, it goes “viral,”
as the Dylan Roof story did. Through “sharing,” “liking,” or “retweeting,” one consumes
information and expresses ones’s response to that information. And it doesn’t end there:
Facebook allows one to “like” a “like,” and Twitter to “retweet” a “retweet,” allowing a third
level of assessment. The build-up of all of these diverse opinions responding to each other
creates what Kitcher terms an “analog of the ‘ideal spectator’”(Kitcher 347). Through its sheer
volume, this network-wide spectator is able to correct for the biases and distortions of
individuals. It is analogous to Aristotle’s description of the judgment of the multitude: through
combination, citizens are able to “understand the whole” (Aristotle 76).

c. Fake News
One damning charge against social media is that it breeds “fake news.” That is, individuals pen
sensationalized, unfounded stories, knowing they are likely to be shared. By the time it is found
39
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that the stories are false, the damage has been done; readers have mistaken a falsity for a real
feature of the world. Further, a story’s blatant falsity many times only helps it spread more
quickly. As per Johnathon Swift: “Falsehood flies, and the Truth comes limping after it”.
PolitiFact, a Pulitzer-prize winning, non-partisan site which fact-checks politician’s
statements, deemed “Fake News” to be 2016’s Lie of the Year40. As they describe the
phenomena:
Fake news is made-up stuff, masterfully manipulated to look like credible journalistic reports that are easily spread
online to large audiences willing to believe the fictions and spread the word.

If, as some claim, fake news is endemic to social media, it would render inoperative our
requirement for ethical deliberation (KE), that individuals hold only true facts about the world.
And it seems to be. Google found the problem troubling enough to warrant an alteration to their
search algorithm, their most valuable asset 41.
Further, the promotion of fake news has real-world consequences, as citizens then operate
under false assumptions regarding their shared world. For example, Facebook was recently sued
by a Syrian migrant to Germany, Anas Modamani, after articles appeared linking him to the
terrorist attacks in Brussels. Anas had recently posted a selfie with Angela Merkel and, due to his
“passing resemblance” to one attacker in Brussels, found himself at the center of a social mediafueled investigation into his whereabouts. As Anas describes, “friends advised that I stay at home
and avoid going out in public, which I did.”42 Anas was excluded from public life because his
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peers believed he had committed treason. Albeit not the usual case of fake news, his story
highlights the dangers of the rapid spread of false belief on social media.
One particularly concerning area of false news is medical information. As more and more
Americans seek second, or sometimes first, opinions on the web, it becomes important that the
decisions they subsequently make are based upon truth. Because of the heightened sensitivity of
the topic, discussions on stopping false news in the medical realm provide a useful blueprint for
our own concern of false news at large. In “Rating Health Information on the Internet”, published
by the AMA, its authors--Alejandro R. Jadad and Anna Gagliardi--come to the following
conclusions regarding tools to filter out falsity: “It is unclear...whether they should exist in the
first place, whether they measure what they claim to measure, or whether they lead to more good
than harm”(Jadad and Gagliardi 611). Their desirability is unclear because some may “view any
attempt by the academic community...to control the production of information...[as] threatening
the new level of freedom of expression...that the internet has generated”(Jadad and Gagliardi
613). In other words, adding stamps of approval will do no more than push the problem back one
step; if any seal of approval is to work, the individual would have to trust that source, which was
the problem to begin with. Further, now that citizens have gained their voice by destroying
traditional gatekeepers through their use of an open internet, they do not want to relinquish
power to any regulations imposed by experts, as had traditionally been the case. Second, the
tools may fail to achieve what they claim, evidence of which leads the authors ask rhetorically:
“is it possible to evaluate information on the Internet?”(Jadad and Gagliardi 613). Given the
“complexity, variability, and dynamism of the information on the Internet” they state, “any
attempt to develop instruments to evaluate such information has been and will be futile”(Jadad
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and Gagliardi 614). Not only is knowledge highly contextual, but any scheme meant to sort
“fake” news from real news is sure to lead to an arms race wherein “fake” news makers will
continually tweak their platform to appear real, as they already do (“masterfully manipulated to
look...credible”). Thus, it seems we are stuck with fake news, with our experts both unwanted
and unable to help.
However, another review of medical information on the web points to a possible solution.
In “Consumer health information seeking on the internet: the state of the art,” authors R.J.W.
Cline and K.M. Haynes describe the problem thusly: “Meager information-evaluation skills add
to consumers' vulnerability, and reinforce the need for quality standards and widespread criteria
for evaluating health information”(Cline 1). The question being asked in both of these papers-can quality standards and criteria be developed to sort out false information from true?--is
understood by these authors as contingent upon the poor “evaluation skills” of consumers. If
consumers themselves were better able to recognize information supported by fact from that
supported by falsity, they could self-regulate their own consumption of news, rather than
instantly devouring all they see.
This indeed can be achieved. Pew found in 2012 that American teachers already saw
teaching students “how to ‘judge the quality of online information’” as a “top priority”43. How
can this be done? One online learning institute believes it is quite simple: “The more time and
effort students allot researching and evaluating information online, the better they will become at
selecting reliable, valuable information from trusted authorities and understanding digital
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functionality.”44 The more one searches the internet, becoming acquainted with its ways, the
more one is able distinguish truth from falsity. The same goes for the experienced philosopher;
with time, and recognition of contradictions, she ceases to believe claims immediately and
instead assumes a skeptical position towards them. Further, because of the flexibility of the
internet, any top-down scheme is certain to fail as fake news incorporates proposed criteria of
truth to give itself a false veneer of respectability. Instead, learning how to discern substantiated
facts from unsubstantiated hearsay is a skill that each individual must learn herself through
experience. In doing so, the crowd becomes better able to judge on its own, forgoing the need for
expert guidance.
Moving back to the Assembly, we find a similar grassroots method in play of deciding
truth. Despite the prevalence of aristocrats, under Pericles it was the people who ultimately made
decisions, with magistrates simply presiding over the process. Classics scholar Josiah Ober notes
that under Pericles “Athens was in fact ruled by the demos. Neither the orators nor the critics of
democracy defined demokratia as a system wherein the citizen masses were effectively taught or
guided by a benevolent, historically-minded elite”(Ober 85). Power was given to the people in a
non-trivial way and they were expected to wield it wisely, their multitude filtering out those
opinions which were too radical. Ober elsewhere reminds us that “in Athenian juries, there was
no judge,” and rather than “deferring to elite expertise...‘the citizenry believed itself to be the
best judge of important matters’”(Ober 92).
Thus it is not a modification to social media that is needed to filter out fake news, but an
increase in social media usage. As individuals become increasingly digitally literate, they can
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provide their own ability to distinguish expertise from presumption. Not only is this method in
line with the “free expression” ethos of the internet, but it also is more responsive to changes in
fake news as it rapidly alters to avoid detection. Sometimes, top-down coordination by experts is
simply too slow.

iii. Conclusion
First, we found that social media--due to its expanded reach and the impulse it breeds towards
searching for the “other” in a non-superficial way--is theoretically an ideal medium to replicate
the Athenian Assembly under Pericles. Then turning to the practical, and borrowing Philip
Kitcher’s method for ethical change, we found that social media replicates the foremost qualities
Kitcher identifies as necessary for ethical deliberation to occur. Specifically, it has the ability to
bring about ethical change by including more citizens’ interests and relevants facts in the
deliberative process. Following Kitcher, it does this by ensuring that all deliberators are
discussing a common object (KE) and that opinions are filtered through a Hall of Mirrors (KW),
correcting for individual biases by reflecting each opinion through other’s opinions of it, and so
on and so forth. The process is akin to the reception one’s speech receives in the Assembly. A
lone jeer is not enough to silence a speaker but must find support within a chorus in order to
force a speaker to sit down. Finally, we found that the oft-noted problem of “fake news” is
indeed a problem, but that its solution lies not in the creation of a filtering mechanism, but in the
increased digital literacy of the citizenry--brought about by increased internet usage. This
accords not only with many expert’s opinions on the matter, but also the democratic workings of
the Assembly itself. In conclusion, increased social media use--achieved by providing increased
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leisure to the citizenry--is liable both theoretically and practically to bring about ethical change,
paving the way towards greater ethical consensus and political action.

iv. Looking Forward
Of course, instituting these payments for social media usage would entail a significant
redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor. In light of this fact, along with conservative
American’s longstanding resistance to wealth redistribution--as exemplified by their deadly fear
of socialism--it is necessary to now justify this mode of redistribution on liberal’s own terms.
That is, insofar as conservatives believe they are guarding “liberty”--understood as free-market
liberalism--from a creeping socialism, they must be convinced that any proposed transfers of
wealth are to be done in the name of promoting that free-market liberalism that they associate
with liberty. For example, one can not justify redistribution with an appeal to “community,” as I-along with many others--have tried. Because of liberalism’s commitment to individual autonomy,
such claims fail prima facie, reliant as they are upon a political value not expressly promoted by
liberalism.
For the second half of this project, I will employ liberalism’s own credos to fend off the
hypothetical liberal’s knee-jerk reaction of opposition to the wealth redistribution I have just
proposed. To do so, I analyze two pieces of liberal dogma: first, Locke’s chapter On Property, in
which he derives a right to property from labor, and second, a Lockean liberal justification of
“workfare”--the form of welfare payments cemented by Bill Clinton in which recipients must
perform specified labor-- as provided by liberal political scientist Oren Levin-Waldman. I argue
that when taken in light of recent developments in capitalist production, the principles upheld in
both arguments in fact point towards the type of non-market distribution which I have argued for
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thus far. To remain faithful to Locke, therefore, is to simultaneously follow Pericles and institute
payments for leisure and corresponding social media usage.

IV. Locke, Private Property, and the Efficiency Thesis

In this chapter, I show that Locke’s justification for a right to private property rests upon his
understanding of that right as instrumental in achieving a common good. This contrasts with a
popular understanding of private property as a moral right in itself, outside of any communal
context or societal effects. While the former would allow for an abridgment of these rights
insofar as it achieves the communal good which they initially aimed at, the latter would restrict
government action to protecting preexisting property, regardless of the consequences of doing so.
By establishing the instrumentality of property rights, I hope to show that Locke held private
ownership of land in no particular high esteem--indeed he affirms that land is given by God to all
in common--but that he nonetheless remained within a private property scheme of ownership
because he believed it was necessary to do so for the community--in this case mankind--to reap
the rewards that the earth has to offer.
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i. Property Rights Paradigms
John Locke, along with Hobbes and J.S. Mill, is considered the “ideological forefather” of
modern liberalism (Hirschmann 9). Of his most decisive contributions is the chapter “On
Property” from his Second Treatise of Government, in which he derives necessary and sufficient
conditions for a right to property. It is important to note that he does not question the existence of
a right to property, but only its specific form, or, who it should be given to. Having spent his first
Treatise denying Adam and his heirs’ dominion over the earth, he is not “content” with the
natural conclusion that no man “should ever come to have a property”(Locke 18). Thus to
replace these now-defunct monarchic property titles, Locke assumes a premise of property and
works backwards to justify its proper foundation.
Among competing theories of Locke’s justification for property, I side with the efficiency
thesis 45, wherein property rights are understood as instrumental in achieving an efficient
exploitation and division of resources. As one author puts it: “Individual property rights are
promoted only insofar as those rights promote the use of labor in advancing society's
welfare”(Henry 615)(emphasis mine). While as a matter of fact a right to property can only
inhere in one person or organization, the benefits which are expected to flow from that right, and
which justify the existence of that right, flow to society at large.
This is in contrast to the more absolutist version of property rights held by libertarian
thinkers such as Nozick or Rothbard. For them, a right to property is a right held by the
individual in isolation from her community; in fact, it is meant to protect her and her things from
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the encroachment of that community. Therefore, any “interference with property is an
interference with a moral right, and therefore wrong in and of itself regardless of its
consequences”(Barros 40-41)(emphasis mine). For them, Locke should be understood as placing
property rights in the hands of the individual because to do so is morally right: the laboring
individual deserves that which she produces. Property thus relies upon no other justification than
the existence of individuals laboring to earn it; once secured by the individual, it is theirs to keep.
In an influential work, John Locke and the origins of private property, Matthew H.
Kramer explicitly attacks the efficiency thesis. He also argues that Locke’s attempt to derive a
right to property from one’s ownership of their own subjectivity, fails. However, both of
Kramer’s views--rejection of the efficiency thesis and rejection of the cogency of property rights
in themselves--are predicated upon a fundamental misconception of what Locke means by
“labor.” I engage with Kramer’s work specifically because I believe this misconception regarding
“labor” is widespread. Through a close reading and subsequent redefinition of “labor,” closer to
what I believe Locke himself intended, I provide a novel method of reviving the efficiency
thesis. In doing so, I preserve the notion that Locke does not hold property to be a moral right,
indivisible from the individual, but an instrumental requiring a communal context.
I begin by outlining Kramer’s objection that Locke fails to establish property rights
derived from the ownership of one’s subjectivity. Then I present another, more minor, charge of
incoherence leveled by Kramer. After, I will provide my own--and what I believe to be Locke’s-definition of “labor”. Support for this definition is to be found in its ability to resolve both
problems posed by Kramer to Locke’s theory. Finally, having proved the appropriateness of this
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definition, I will employ it to overcome Kramer’s denial of the efficiency thesis, responding to
objections at the end.

ii. Kramer’s Objection
According to Kramer, Locke “unwittingly confirmed...his argument [for property] was
invalid”(Kramer, 150). Apparently, Locke’s argument rests upon an equivocation of “labor.”
While “we indeed can tell...he was drawing an inference [from labor to property],” says Kramer,
the argument is invalid unless he is drawing an identity. His reconstructs Locke’s main argument
as follows :

1. In the state of nature, the labor of each person P belonged exclusively to P himself.

2. Each person P who improved some unowned assets by working on them had thereby mixed his labor
with them.
3. In the state of nature, the labor of each person P belonged exclusively to P himself. (Kramer 150)

For Kramer, n premises 1 and 2, the referent is located “within the subject,” akin to “an activity
or a capacity or a flow of energy”(Kramer149). In conclusion 3, however, the referent of “labor”
moves from within the subject to “within the object”(Kramer 150). He concludes: “the argument
could not be valid” for it allows the possibility that “true statements about one kind of labor
[would be] false when advanced about the other kind”(Kramer 150). We must also assume that
Locke was not claiming an identity, for otherwise “there would have been no need whatsoever
for [him] to construct an argument”(Kramer 150). Thus, Locke’s syllogism a non sequitur, doing
little by way of establishing a right to property.
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iii. Consumption as Property
Kramer goes on to identify other flaws in Locke’s reasoning elsewhere in On Property.
Discussing Locke’s description of an indian picking up--and thereby gaining property in--berries
before appropriating their “nourish[ment]”, Kramer says Locke for “conflat[es] possession and
ownership, or, enjoyment and exclusive dominion”(Kramer 115). Locke’s assumption that
ownership is necessary for survival is undermined, Kramer claims, by recognition that within his
state of nature, people “could readily survive without owning any goods, as long as they all had
privileges to use and consume the goods”(Kramer 115). In the context of the definitions Kramer
provides of Right and Privilege (from Hohfeld)46, this amounts to claiming that a right against
others’ interference in one’s enjoyment of a good is superfluous to one’s enjoyment of that good.
All that one really requires, in order to enjoy a good, is the lack of a duty to abstain from the
enjoyment of that good. In other words, one need not be assured that they will be undisturbed in
order to consume a berry; rather, one need only be assured that they themselves are not forbidden
to consume that berry. Once this assurance is met, one is free to begin consumption, come what
may. Thus, ownership is not strictly necessary for consumption and thus survival, only the mere
privilege to consume is.
Logically speaking, Kramer is correct: for the freedom to X, the lack of proscription
against doing X is sufficient. However, this is only to reject Locke’s premise, not his argument.
Specifically, it seeks to bring into question the very necessity of property rights and their
46

Right--”being endowed with a right consist in being normatively protected against someone else’s interference or
in being entitled to someone else’s assistance or remuneration, with regard to a certain action or a certain state of
affairs.”
Privilege--”to have a privilege to engage in a certain action is to be free from a duty to eschew the action; likewise,
to have a privilege to abstain from a certain action is to be free from a duty to undertake the action”(Kramer 16).
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ontological status. However, for Locke, the question at hand is not if men come to have property,
but “how men might come to have a property,”(Locke 18)(emphasis mine). Locke is supposing
humans do have property at some point in order to then move backwards to find its rightful
justification and starting point.
The purpose of the indian example is thus vastly different than what Kramer takes it to
be. It is not to show that an individual must obtain a property right to consume food, for this
would be absurd. As Locke himself notes, “If such a consent as that was necessary, man [would
have] starved”; there is simply no time to await the rise of civilization and the granting of
property rights when one needs nourishment(Locke 19). Instead, the example makes the
unobjectionable observation that, if we are to grant property rights, as has already been the case
for hundreds of years by the time Locke is writing, the best place to begin looking for them is the
certain ownership one has over the things they have consumed. “He that is nourished,” Locke
says, “has certainly appropriated...to himself”(Locke 19)(emphasis mine).
Kramer himself contends that such an ownership over consumed goods is absolutely
useless. Nobody would attempt to obtain bile-drenched food out of one’s stomach and, if they
did, the act would be illegal regardless. However for Locke, this is precisely the point. Once food
has been consumed it becomes “a part of” its consumer, and “another can no longer have any
right to it,” as Kramer himself affirms(Locke 19). If property is ownership, then it should be
uncontroversial to claim that the indian thus owns the food he consumes. As Kramer notes, this a
trivial point and basically unobjectionable. It amounts to no more than a restatement of Locke’s
initial premise, an idea at the heart of Anglican jurisprudence: each man has a right to his own
body. In Lockean terms, “the natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on
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earth”(Locke 17). The supreme triviality of this point for Anglo-American thinkers makes it the
best place to begin our search for when this ownership--here in its final, most definite stage of
post-consumption--begins.

iv. From Consumption to Labor
If a consumed good is “certainly” the indian’s property, then “when did [it] begin to be his”
property? (Locke 19) Because Locke wants to say that there is a time prior to a good’s
consumption in which a property within that good is acquired, we must look back at the relevant
actions leading to that good’s consumption, choosing amongst them to determine which action
instantiated the doer’s property in the good. In pursuit of this action, Locke poses a series of
possible answers: is it “when he digested?...when he eat [sic]?...when he boiled?...when he
brought them home?...when he picked them up?”(Locke 19). He responds that it is “plain” that if
it was not the initial “gathering” (of acorns), no other action could serve as the relevant
instantiating act. By adding something “more than nature,” the gatherer gains a “private right” in
the goods he gathered(Locke 19). The acquisition of property is thus simultaneous with the
performance of the act that initiates the chain of actions which eventually allow for
consumption--an action he terms “labour”(Locke 19).
What becomes evident in this analysis is the reliance of labor’s justificatory power to
found property rights on the latter act of consumption. Such a reliance seems to leave property
rights on rather shaky ground. If labor only justifies property insofar as it leads to consumption,
the possibility is left open of laboring without acquiring corresponding property rights should
one fail to consume what they produce, a puzzling result. Because a temporal gap often exists
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between the time one labors and when one finally consumes what they have produced, the status
of a stolen good appears in doubt. In other words, if it is only my consumption that can justify
my invoking a right against another’s interference with the goods I have produced, how can I
claim an invasion of my rights when an apple which I have yet to consume is stolen from my
cupboard?

v. From Subject to Object--Redefining “Labor”
The problem is identical in form to Kramer’s more central objection to Locke’s derivation of
property rights. Both question how the fact of ownership over one’s own subjectivity can then
justify ownership of over objects existing outside of oneself. In the first case, Kramer was
explicit in showing that Locke failed to cross the void between individual subjectivity and
objective ownership. In the second, Kramer failed to understood why a consumed good was
necessarily the consumer’s property. However in denying these accounts of acquisition, while
failing to provide their replacement, Kramer does not disprove the arguments, but rejects their
premise that property as a right exists.
In order to answer this dilemma, while maintaining the existence of property right, we are
left to conclude that labor, far from merely “an activity or a capacity” residing in the subject, is
actually a concept describing that energy which is expended in the service of, and ultimately
leading to, consumption. To provide the link between the subject and the object they both
produce and have the rightful title to consume, labor must be understood as a teleology
encompassing them both. It is not any labor, but that “flow of energy” performed in the service
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of consumption. Because property thus requires consumption for its existence, a right to property
does not arise until a good is consumed.
As for the apple from the cupboard, once consumption does occur and the teleology is
complete, a claim can be made by the good’s producer that the good was not consumed by its
rightful owner. If the claimant can prove that the good’s consumer did not produce the good, nor
rightfully receive it from the original producer, or another whom had himself received it
rightfully from the original producer, then its consumer can be charged with theft. Thus when our
producer opens their cupboard with a mind to make apple pie, and sees their apple missing, they
would file a claim as they ordinarily would for a stolen good. If the culprit is found, along with
the apple, it is returned, he is charged with attempted robbery, and the producer enjoys their
property right a la mode later than evening. If the culprit is found, apple already consumed, they
are charged with robbery, and justice served.
However if the original producer only notices their is apple is missing during a daily
surveillance of their antique apple collection, the thief can make a claim to the apple herself. If
they can prove that the producer was unlikely to consume the good before it went rotten, and that
they themselves or another to whom they had given it to was able to consume the good before it
did so, no robbery occurred47. For example, if the producer had 300 apples which all were going
to rot in the next ten days, and the claimant showed that the producer was unlikely to consume or
aid in the consumption of thirty apples each day, the thief would have been justified in
consuming apples on his own.

47

This also might be attempted robbery on behalf of the apple collector.
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Identification of ownership thus rests not entirely upon the initial powers being expended
but the actor’s intent in doing so. If the initial laborer has plans for consuming, or providing for
the consumption of, the good that they produce, the ownership title is theirs. If, however, they
have so many goods that they neglect most of them, our sense of justice is served by saying that
the thief who stole a good without being noticed because the producer had so many goods piled
up, did not really steal, but aided in consumption. If he is caught, he has the opportunity to return
the good, or convince a jury that the producer had no plans for consumption. Our sense of justice
is well-served because property titles are consumption-centric, meaning one loses title as one
gathers good which one cannot possible consume. Imagine the producer as a sun, her goods in
orbit; the more goods she accumulates, the farther away they are placed, and the weaker the tug
of gravity becomes. The same goes for the owner who stockpiles goods: those within their
immediate range of consumption are firmly theirs but, as we move outwards towards goods
which are in excess of one’s consumption abilities, their claim weakens.

vi. Kramer and Efficiency
I overturn Kramer’s definition of labor in pursuit of a larger goal: to refute his denial of the
efficiency thesis48. Once again, this thesis holds that Locke justified his scheme of individual
property rights on the grounds that it provided a good for society as a whole: specifically, an
efficient production and distribution of goods expropriated from a limited amount of resources.
This is contrast to those who hold property rights to be absolute, reliant upon no other end for
them to achieve, and thus inalienable by any legislative action. I aim to prove the former because
48

“Understood in the current language of economics, these passages [those which supporters of the “efficiency
thesis” garner for their support] commend private property as the most efficient vehicle for apportioning
wealth”(Kramer 118).
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I believe Locke--in line with his Christianity-- held that land was by nature communal, and thus
only accorded private title to it insofar as that would allow efficient production. The only
consideration that could overrule his god-given communism was the necessity of making the
land bear fruit in order to multiply the human race.
For Kramer, the efficiency thesis is incorrect because it is incoherent to base an
individual right (to property) upon a communal good (of efficient production and distribution)
unless a causal relation between the two can be firmly established. He disputes on two separate
grounds the efficiency theorist’s claim that this causal mechanism does in fact exist. First, he
rejects the notion that ownership enables increased and efficient production. Then, even granting
an increase in production, he attacks the idea that this increase in production is a communal
good: without an explicit mechanism assuring that the increase in production is distributed
amongst all, benefits may only accrue to a select group 49. Thus, the efficiency theorist can not
claim that the individual right to property is instrumental is achieving communal good because,
as Kramer says, “we should not infer that every person fared better in the scheme of proprietary
rights” (Kramer 125). I will briefly deal with the first contention, then attack the latter using my
teleological definition of Lockean “labor.”

a. Increased Production
Seeking the philosophical basis for Locke’s implicit claim that “the most efficient uses of
nature’s bounty” depends upon “private ownership,” Kramer suggests what he has in mind is

49

“Even though have avouched for the sake of argument that the scheme of mere privileges would have generated a
somewhat smaller measure of output on the whole, we should not infer that every person fared better in the
scheme of proprietary rights”(Kramer 125)(emphasis mine).
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something like Aristotle in the Politics (Kramer 119)50. Kramer responds that this picture
“presumes people were so voracious...they would refuse to work...unless they reaped all the
material profits,” a premise not even Hobbes would endorse(Kramer,120). This refutation,
however, stems from a failure to distinguish between self-regarding and other-regarding
interests51. It is a trivial truth that individuals act so as to benefit themselves. By allowing them
to benefit from their work, therefore, they are liable to work more. This benefit, however, is not
dependent upon one’s “voraciousness,” in the sense that one seeks to consume all that they
produce. Rather it includes such diverse interests as “help[ing] one’s friends, guests, or
companions,” which, Aristotle notes, “one can [do] if one has property”(Aristotle 83). The
distinction is not between hedonistic consumption and communitarian sharing, but more like the
difference between taxation by a government in which one has a say on how that money is spent,
and one in which an individual’s interests are ignored 52. The incentive provided by ownership,
therefore, does not rely upon a perspective focused solely upon oneself, but rather one which
allows the placing of greater weight upon certain individuals’ interests due to one’s relationship
with them--a common human incentive.

b. Restrictions on Ownership
Even granting that property rights increase output, Kramer still sees a “yawning gap” between
the resulting “individual well-being,” and the supposed “collective well-being” which served as
its basis (Kramer 124). For him, forge their identity would require some bold assumptions about
50

“when care for property is divided up, it leads to...greater care being given”...”Evidently, then, it is better for
property to be private”(Aristotle 83)
51

“Self-regarding actions are actions which effect only the agent and have no effect on others”(Ten 29)

52

No taxation without representation.

69

the make-up of society 53. However, Kramer missteps in assuming that the achievement of
communal good is dependent upon each and every individual’s increasing their labor and
property. By neglecting the teleological aspect of “labor,” Kramer fails to identify the
redistributive mechanism implicit within Locke’s theory.
If what justifies property is its consumption, it follows that one loses a claim to property
that goes unconsumed54. If more property is amassed than is “to any advantage of life,” the
surplus must be either redistributed or “looked on as waste,” liable to become “the possession of
any other”(Locke 24). Though not all peoples are explicitly provided for--as this would require
the coercion of labor--Locke’s “waste” requirement ensures any output above that which satisfies
human needs for livelihood will be given to other members of the community. This is as close to
communism as Locke will tread.
Perhaps what disturbs Kramer is Locke’s subsequent introduction of “gold and silver”
into his state of nature, and the “disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth” which
follows(Locke 29). As C.B. Macpherson notes, the introduction of money seems to “render
inoperative the spoilage limitation”(Locke xvii). However, does it really follow from the use of
currency that food no longer spoils? One is still responsible for distributing surplus goods; the
difference is now the producer may “receive in exchange for the overplus gold and silver”(Locke
29). Because they are extraneous to the “support and comfort” of mankind, hoarding these metals
is not injurious to others (Locke 18). Thus the spoilage limitation is indeed overcome, but not in
Macpherson’s sense. The introduction of currency does not “establish a natural right to unlimited
53

“One will have to maintain that every person within the state of nature had just the talents and likings that would
cause him to get more wealth in a scheme of private property than in any scheme of privileges...however, such a
contention will be ludicrously far-fetched”(Kramer 125).
54

“If the fruits rotted, or the venison putrified...he had no right” and was “liable to be punished”(Locke 24).
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amounts of private property” without regard for others(Locke xvii). Rather, it enables an
individual, should he find “gold and silver” to be of value, to reap benefits from his labor in the
form of these precious metals long after he has satisfied any need for consumption.

c. Mechanism of Distribution
The question remains how these excess goods are to make it into the hands of those who need
them. Given the latter’s need of these goods to sustain their body, the producer seems to hold
unlimited power in negotiations for these goods. However, this leverage is diminished by the
producer’s need to distribute his goods before they spoil, or face punishment. The case is
analogous to a clearance sale. Still, the great power possessed by those with excess holdings is
not to be overlooked.
This understanding of property enables us to make sense of Locke’s claim that “the desire
of having in our possession...more than we have need of,” is “the desire ‘for the submission of
other’s to one’s will’” and the “root of all evil”(Tarcov 142)(Levin-Waldman 44). In attempting
to defend his own absolutist conception of property as being “joined to liberty,” Oren LevinWaldman admits that many readers will be surprised to find that Locke holds such an opinion
regarding its accumulation(Levin-Waldman 44). To escape the confusion, Levin-Waldman
submits that what Locke was discouraging was not the desire for accumulation of property as
such, but rather the “desire for property as power over others”(Levin-Waldman 44). Clearly his
claim fails as it seeks to open up a space between the two terms which Locke expressly disavows
by equating them.
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If labor is the necessary precursor to the existence of comestibles, as well the creator of
property rights over those comestibles, we can see why the accumulation of property would
entail dominion over others. In accumulating that which is necessary for another’s survival, the
other, if unable to produce for himself, is at the mercy of the laborer. The only way to overcome
this dominion, absent the presence of time-limits on sales for consumption, is to instill in citizens
a willingness to give away that which they have produced. Coincidentally, this is the mindset
Locke seeks to nurture through his educational system55, and one which he identifies as vital to
the functioning of a liberal society.

vii. Objections
By failing to recognize the teleologic nature of Locke’s conception of “labor,” Kramer is unable
to identify the link between the laboring individual and her right to the nourishment consumed
thereafter. In fact, they two are parts of the same action, relating to one another as cause and
effect. This teleologic conception of labor allows us to identify the mechanism whereby
individual benefits from property rights redound to society as a whole. If property rights only
follow from work performed for the purposes of consumption, and each individual is bounded in
the amount of consumption they need and can enjoy before spoilage, all excess production is
distributed amongst those with less. Although prosperous laborers may seek gold or silver in
return, Locke urges the act of giving as the proper mode of liberal civility. The link between
individual and communal well-being is thus made operational-the efficiency thesis is alive and
well.

55

”And by this Means, by a constant Practice, Children having made it easie to themselves to part with what they
have...they may take Pleasure...in being Kind, liberal and Civil to others”(Tarcov 142)(emphasis mine).
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I anticipate an objection to my reading of Locke due to its reliance on “consumption” to
identify property rights. In an oft-cited passage Locke remarks that “a king of a large and fruitful
[Native American] territory...feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day-labourer in
England”(Locke 26). This is understood as an indictment of the subsistence farming system for
its inability to cultivate wealth. As per Alan Ryan’s interpretation, the claim is “that even the
worst off in modern society is better off than he would be outside it”(Locke and Sigmund 303).
Having been “furnished as liberally as any other people, with the materials of plenty,” the Native
Americans lack a desire to “improv[e]...by labour” and thus, while being “rich in land,” are
“poor in all the comforts of life”(Locke 25). Though it is only the “penury of his condition”
which forces man to labor, the benefits from labor do not cease following the achievement of
those bare necessities which enable the prolongation of life56(Locke 21).
Construing my usage of “consumption” quite literally, it may be argued that I have
overlooked this passage. In claiming that the only work which engenders property is that which
provides sustenance, I seem to be advocating for a community whose sole aim is the continuation
of life, and not its improvement--contrary to Locke’s expressed preference. However, my
definition does not rule out the possibility of property in amenities. In fact, it is closer to the
definition of consumption provided by economists--”the use of goods and services by
households”.57 This further definition, however, appears to strip “consumption” of its ability to
distinguish between work that is property-enabling and that which is not. Lacking a clear
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The world is given to men not only “to make use of it to the best advantage of life” but also for “convenience,” as
well as the “comfort of their being”(Locke,18).
57

"Consumption." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., n.d. Web. 02 May 2017.
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delineation, no upward bound to an individual’s accumulation exists, and thus the redistribution
mechanism falls away. Can we ascertain a middle ground between these two definitions?
Indeed we can. The goods whose usage is titled “consumption” need not be a static
category. It should progress along with society. As the economy matures, and more wealth
created, the number of goods which are “consumed” should increase, reflecting the fact of
greater abundance58 . That which falls outside the scope we may entitle “luxury,” a category used
to render a judgment about a good: its primary worth is not in its utility. To use an example from
Locke’s era, large estates overseen by feudal lords are not wasteful by their very nature. They are
a waste, however, when other individuals within the same society may be saved from starvation
by gaining some ownership in of that land. The property of being a “consumped” or “luxury”
good is thus relational.
In modern times, we recognize a “poverty line.” This is a socially determined level of
income below which we have deemed it difficult for individuals to continue a dignified
existence. Though this level is too low, given comforts enjoyed by others within society, its form
provides a blueprint for distinguishing between work performed in the service of consumption
and that which is not. Until all individuals within society obtain the bundle of goods (or level of
income) determined to be necessary for a worthwhile living, the accumulation of goods or
income outside of that scope should fall under deep suspicion. This reflects the intuitive idea that
all should be provided with shelter before an individual may expect a right to a castle.
It also allows us to extend the notion of “consumption” to durable goods. Let’s take an
example of a computer. Outside of extraordinary cases, we can probably assume that an
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Televisions, for example, were once a rarity.
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individual need not possess more than two computers at a time. This is not morally wrong, it is
just highly unlikely that one individual would “consume” more than two computers at a time in
the same way that an average person would “consume” a computer. He may, for example, use
thirty computers at once, using each to open a single search tab, but this would not be entitled
“consumption” of the good as it is a highly idiosyncratic usage. The same goes for a home: a
family of four is unlikely to “consume” thirty bedrooms in the way bedrooms are typically meant
to be “consumed.” All that we need to make such judgments is an understanding of how goods
are typically “consumed.” Of course, if the mansion’s owner would like to keep property title to
his bedrooms, he need only allow others to “consume” his excess rooms for sleep: because they
are in fact consumed, and he initially produced them, no question of property title arises, and he
remains in his abode.
Another objection may be leveled at the feasibility of the mechanism of distribution I
indicate as latent in Locke’s theory. If an individual may stockpile gold, and then use that gold to
purchase the surplus property of others, what is to stop him from sitting on that property rather
putting it to productive purpose? This mistaken concern is analogous to Macpherson’s claiming
that Locke “established a natural right to unlimited amount of private property”(Locke xvii). To
the contrary, the introduction of coin does not uproot another’s right to appropriate one’s waste.
Rather it is a method whereby those industrious men who “had agreed that a little piece of
yellow metal...should be worth a great piece of flesh,” may feel that they have received
something in return for distributing away their surplus(Locke 23). It is a tool to lubricate
exchange by overcoming trepidation towards giving things away. Locke does not permit the
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unlimited accumulation of truly necessary items, only these tokens of value59. Though Locke
recognizes how foolish this is given that “things really useful...are generally things of short
duration,” he feels no need to correct for this irrationality given the distribution of really useful
goods it allows(Locke 28). While things people really need--housing, clothing, food--do wear
down, albeit some sooner than others, gold and silver remain through time with a polish here and
there.

viii. Conclusion
Basing property upon a teleological conception of “labor,” Locke achieves two goals. First, by
requiring physical, value-adding labor, he denies monarchical property rights according to title.
Then, by limiting title to labor for consumption, he places limits on the laborer’s holdings. While
not expressly providing for the community, his threat of punishment for wastage--should a
surplus be produced--ensures that surplus will be spread rather than allowed to waste. Finally,
confronting the rise of capitalism--and the use of gold and silver--Locke allows capital’s
unlimited acquisition, so log as it does not hinder the distribution of really useful goods.

59

“..if he would exchange his nuts for a piece of metal, pleased with its colour; or exchange his keep for shells, or
wool for a sparkling pebble or diamond, and keep those by him all his life, he invaded not the right of others, he
might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased; exceeding of the bounds of his just property not
lying in the largeness of his possession, but the perishing of any thing uselesly in it”(Locke 28). The proper objects
for accumulation are not the nuts or wool, but the diamonds and shells.
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V. Workfare and Reciprocity

In the previous chapter, I upheld an efficiency thesis reading of Locke’s private property rights
against objections made to it by Kramer. I concluded that Locke meant to grant property rights to
individuals in an effort to achieve a communal good--efficient production and distribution of
goods--rather than as the prescription of an absolutist moral maximum. In doing so, I opened up
space for governmental transfers of wealth which would have been foreclosed had property
rights been understood as inalienable. By connecting property rights to an end they are meant to
achieve, property rights are able to viewed--and altered--in light of their ability to achieve the
end for which they were put in place.
In modern America, wealth transfers do in fact occur. Where they are not connected to a
specific program, but meant to elevate the well-being of a disadvantaged individual, however,
they take the form of workfare. Begun by Reagan and signed into law by Clinton in 1992,
workfare requires participants to perform labor in return for the payments they receive. Because
what I am proposing--payments for social media usage-- is in effect a welfare program, in this
section I will explore this liberal workfare state, exposing its ultimate implicit reliance upon a
notion of reciprocity. Reciprocity is understood as the principle that a state can only provide
payments to its citizens insofar as the state is assured to thereby gain an equal benefit in return.
In other words, the state is constrained in its giving of payments to instances of assured “mutual
advantage,” thereby making illegal any state attempt to provide payments to citizens merely out
of mercy, fairness, or concerns of welfare.
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I argue that reciprocity was originally invoked so as to privilege the economic over the
political sphere in the distribution of property. This in turn was done to justify declaring
monarchical property titles illegitimate for this was the predominant form of property title in
England at the time, and one which the Founders sought to escape. Now, however, the economic
sphere’s ability to guarantee reciprocity has become sufficiently problematized as to warrant its
closer scrutiny--the subject of my next and final chapter.
First, I present ongoing debates regarding the proper form the welfare state should take .
Then, I present the liberal defense of American workfare state. Next, I show why this defense
implicitly relies upon reciprocity. Finally, I discuss other relevant examples in which reciprocity
was invoked, as well as briefly problematize its current status within the free market.

i. Decommodification versus Activation
Debates surrounding the “Welfare State,” Richard Titmuss explains, revolve around its
“principles and objectives”(Pierson and Castles 40). Using his distinction, we can identify two
grounds of welfare policy disagreement-- its objectives and its principles. Or, what is its end and,
what is the principle--as expressed in the particular means employed to reach that end--which
grounds citizens’ notion of the welfare state? Responses can be plotted along two axes: decommodification versus activation and welfare versus workfare. The former deals with the ends
of a proposed welfare system, and the latter its means towards getting there. I will present both
debates, discussing the ideology behind each.
Decommodification refers to policies which free citizens from the “market compulsion to
work” through the provision of “a socially acceptable standard of living,” independent of their
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market participation(Huo et al. 7)(Tabin et al. 133). To its supporters, decommodification is the
political response “implied” by “modern social rights” in the face of a “hegemonic” capitalism
which has left individuals “depend[ent] entirely” upon their ability to sell their labor 60 (Pierson
and Castles 163). Describing the freedom not to labor for another as a right, supporters describe
decommodification as a response to a change of facts, and not a change of opinion regarding
rights 61. Its potential beneficiaries are the “students, single mothers and artists..no longer be[ing]
required to take jobs that would prevent them from pursuing the very lifestyles they were seeking
to support,” as well as impoverished individuals freed from “tak[ing] the most menial, alienating
and exploitative of jobs simply to survive”(Panitch 937). Severing the link between survival and
employment, decommodification ensures the latter is not undertaken purely for the sake of the
former. This in turn strengthens the bargaining position of the worker, allowing her greater
control in her economic and material fate.62 To one supporter, it means “the ‘real freedom’ to
choose how to spend [one’s] time”(Panitch 935).
While decommodification holds sway in many Nordic states, it does not in more liberal
regimes, such as the U.S.63 Due to a commitment to achieving “high public employment,”64
increasing labor market participation “takes [political] precedence over labor market exit.”65
60

“Capitalism is defined [by Marx] as a set of social relations produced by a mode of production characterized by
the commodification of the product of labor”(Tabin et al. 129).
61

“In pre-capitalist societies, few workers were properly commodities in the sense that their survival was contingent
upon the sale of their labour power”(Pierson and Castles 163).
62

“De-commodification strengthens the workers and weakens the absolute authority of the employer”(Pierson and
Castles 163).
63

“...Esping-Anderson identifies the Nordic welfare states as the most decommodifying type of welfare states,”
while, “by contrast, the liberal welfare state regimes are the least decommodifying”(Huo et al. 7).
64

Consider, for example, the Department of Labor’s monthly release of the “Employment Situation Summary,” or,
so-called “jobs report.”
65

“...the emphasis [for liberal welfare policies] is on involuntary and temporary separation from the labour
market...and on maximum support for reintegration”(Huo et al. 8).
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Thus, the goal of reinstating a “right”--as per decommodification--is replaced by the search for
“‘a productivist reordering of social policy,’” with the aim of putting individuals back to
work(Pierson and Castles 458). The objective of liberal policies is activation. Instead of
immediate economic freedom, welfare payments go towards long-term “social
investment...facilitating labour market entry and...increasing productivity”(Huo et al. 8)66.
The motives behind these policies reflect normative stances towards different forms of
“dependence”. For activation-minded policymakers, a dependence upon employment for
survival is less harmful to an individual’s autonomy than a dependence upon the state67. By
investing in “skills,” they argue, an individual “ensure[s] returns” on their investment in the
future. Unlike decommodification programs, which rely on political consensus, activation
policies only require upon an individual motivated to improve their skills, along with a
functioning labor market. Thus, “among economists” and others who place great faith in the free
market, activation policies “will always appear in a more positive light”(Jensen 60).
For decommodifiers, the obnoxious form of dependence is that of the worker upon his
employer. Making clear a commitment to Marx, they describe their policy as a “‘revolt against
proletarian subjection to the wage relationship, and hence to the capitalists‘ rule’”(Panitch 937).
If the state provides income, they reason, citizens will not necessarily need to ask capitalists to
do so as well. This cushions them against the “basic social risk[s]” endemic to markets, such as
unemployment(Panitch 939).
66

“Contending that social policies do not play the sole role of allowing workers to ‘opt out’ of the labour market,
Iverson (2005) shows that social policies can play a market-correcting role by inducing investment in specific skills.
To the extent that workers and employers invest in skills and wish to ensure returns on these investments in the
future, social policies protect the position of the works in the labour market”(Huo et al. 8).
67

“And though the employment relationship causes individuals to rely on their labour and therefore commodifies
them, market dependency may actually be less threatening to an individual’s autonomy than family or state
dependency”(Huo et al. 8).
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Differences in opinion regarding the desirability of market- as opposed to state“dependence” stem from different understandings of the necessity of actions within these
institutions. For activationists, political action relies upon consensus, while market action is
undertaken by isolated entities who are viewed as passive responders to market forces 68.Thus an
individual ingratiated with market forces, possessing valuable skills, necessitates an offer of
employment. Therefore the development of marketable skills is the best way to achieve
independence insofar as it is defined as a guaranteed stream of income. While government action
is determined by legislation which is out of one’s control, market actors perform necessary,
predictable responses to the objective market forces brought about by oneself.
To a decommodifier, it is instead capitalists who wield a transient, changing power, while
democratic governments instantiate assurances to protect rights69. Thus, they describe their
policy as a preserver of “rights,” as opposed to a provision of privileges. The right to survival
free from compulsion, they claim, is fundamental to the legitimacy of democratic governance.
Therefore the expansion of capitalist practice, and the compulsion to labor as an employee it
imposes, “implies” the necessity of establishing of decommodifying policies. It is the political
body--forced to protect rights in order to retain legitimacy--and not the capitalist entrepreneur,
whose actions are necessitated in response to objective facts, thereby making them conducive to
the promotion of individual independence.

68

The idea of a purely reactionary, mechanistic market actor is best captured by an analogy made by F.A. Hayek:
“the price system...enables entrepreneurs, by watching the movement of a comparatively few prices, as an engineer
watches the hands of a few dials, to adjust their activities to those of their fellows”(Hayek 95)(emphasis mine). The
entrepreneur passively receives information and responds accordingly, as if each situation entailed only one possible
appropriate action--they are constrained.
69

i.e. Due process, habeus corpus, bearing arms.
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Both sides agree on the desirability of eradicating “dependence,” defining this as
economic reliance upon another. They differ in their view as to which relationship--between the
state and its citizens or between the capitalists and her workers--involves the more troubling
form of dependency. For activationists, the unemployed individual has the “status of a dependent
child,” emphasizing the reliance of the decommodified citizen upon the goodwill of a paternal
government in the form of welfare payments (Minsky 22). Through gaining valuable skills, they
argue, capitalists--in response to her newfound objective value--are constrained to award her
employment and income, thus securing their freedom. Decommodifiers, on the other hand, view
government as constrained to preserve rights, identifying one’s autonomy over survival as an
example of a right. Furthermore, capitalists, because of their privileged position--after all it is not
their survival on the line--will always be less dependent than the worker, likely to exploit the
dependence of the latter. Thus, it is within the sphere of the political, and not the economic, that
individuals are able to obtain meaningful freedom from dependence.

ii. Welfare versus Workfare
Another axis of dispute concerns the principle behind welfare as understood by the relation of
the individual to their economy. Specifically, it concerns notion of fault. When someone is
unemployed, fault for this inability to secure employment may be attributed either to a “market”
or to the individual. The choice of attribution determines whether payments should be
guaranteed--as in the case of disability, the individual not needing to perform any labor in
return--or stipulated--as in the case of typical contracts, with individuals performing specified
labor in to obtain benefit. Fault, while not itself necessitating the usage of stipulations, is
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necessary to ground any stipulation on payments because, as Judith Sklar explains, otherwise
stipulations would be “‘coercive in that one who is forced to work due to a condition beyond
one’s control is effectively being punished’”(Waldman 122). If instead welfare is compensation
for the ills of the “market,” and not an act of volition, the possibility of stipulation is foreclosed.
If, however, it is a policy to correct the mistakes of the individual, the state has every right to ask
for something in return.
Conservative author Lawrence Mead sums up the debate when he states: “Liberals
[supporters of stipulation-free welfare] need to show why poor people are blameless, [and]
therefore still deserving [of benefits without labor]; conservatives [supporters of payments with
stipulations] need to show how the poor are competent and why they need to be held
accountable[in the form of being made to labor]”(Pierson and Castles 116). Mead himself sees
poverty as a “motivation problem” and champions Ronald Reagan’s “changing welfare into
workfare70”(Pierson and Castles 116). His idea of the principle behind welfare--not remedy for
“market” ills, but safety-net for personal failings--determined his justifying imposing
stipulations 71.
Combined, a state’s response to each of these two axes determine what form its welfare
system will take. The chart below provides a simple visualization of the four options:

70

Workfare: a welfare system that requires those receiving benefits to perform some work or to participate in job
training.
71

Thus, Titmuss ask: “can we and should we, in providing benefits and compensation, distinguish between ‘faults’
in the individual and the ‘faults’ of society,” adding that a response is needed before we can “identify and discuss the
next steps in progress towards a ‘Welfare Society’”(Pierson and Castles 45-47).
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Objective/Method

Activation
(employment)
Decommodification
(decreased reliance
on market wage)

Welfare

Workfare

Offer of skill investment,
payments guaranteed

Conditioned on performance
of skill-increasing tasks

Unconditional, guaranteed
payments--”Universal Basic
Income”

Conditions which are not
investments in workers’
skills

iii. American Welfare: The Liberal Defense
Having outlined the questions to be answered by any welfare system, I will now turn to the
responses they have received in America. To do so, I will examine the liberal defense of the
modern American welfare state as offered by one of its apologists--Oren Levin-Waldman. While
he provides separate arguments for upholding both an activation-minded and workfarestipulating policy, I will show that they both ultimately rely upon a notion of “reciprocity”.
Specifically, the presumption that reciprocity is best met through the market system, and not
politics.
In clear contrast to the “social rights” invoked by decommodifiers, Levin-Waldman,
citing a Supreme Court decision, affirms that American welfare policy is predicated upon the
voluntary “altruism of the community” and not its recognition of rights (Waldman 112). He
affirms that citizens are only mandated to provide payments while “the social benefits...surpass
the immediate costs”(Waldman 63). To ensure this happens, he concludes, workfare is employed.
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If society is not constrained to transfer its goods, it must be induced to through the promise of
“social benefit.”72
Once again, conditioned welfare implies individual fault. Though the Court does not
address the question directly, its decision provides prima facie evidence for the prevalence of the
individual-fault theory. Waldman also notes that opinion polls show that a majority of Americans
view a “work ethic,” defined as holding a job, as “key” to citizenship(Waldman 122). If
unemployment de-legitimizes one’s citizenship, it must be understood as a result of choice; any
other cause would be unreasonable to motivate such a punishment. Thus, it is clear a majority of
Americans view the individual as at fault in the case of their own unemployment, and therefore
feel justified in requesting labor to be performed in return for their payment of income.
Waldman uses welfare’s status as a privilege to uphold its stipulated labor requirements.
If the individual had no reasonable expectation that welfare payments would be provided--as he
would if they were a right of his--it is not “punishment” when stipulations are attached. Then,
further reifying the idea that unemployment is a choice, and thus the unemployed individual’s
fault, Waldman compares these stipulations to environmental regulations on business. They are
both, he says, the “attach[ment] [of] conditions to one’s pursuit of private interest in a market
economy”(Waldman 124). Thus, he equalizes the position of the businessman looking to turn a
profit and the unemployed individual seeking welfare payments: they are both undertaking
voluntary “pursuit[s]”. In conclusion, Waldman holds that because unemployment is an

72

One author describes these programs thusly: “The workers can be outsourced to private charity groups to do any
number of jobs that are currently not done. They might clean rivers, help the disabled, care for the elderly, clean up
graffiti, plant public gardens... the list of potential useful things these people might do is boundless”(Montier and
Pilkington17).
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individual fault, a society which then voluntarily shares with that individual may expect the
performance of tasks in return.
Turning the focus from welfare’s contributors--society--to its recipients, Waldman also
upholds a commitment to activation. He defines “the meaning of independence” within a modern
state as “to have a job”(Waldman 60). This explicitly rejects the decommifiers’ claim that wage
labor is dependence. Instead, to achieve independence,73 the state must pursue policies enabling
citizens to gain employment.
Conveniently, both liberal commitments--activation and workfare--point to the same
policy. Under workfare, not only is “something useful...presumably produced,” benefitting
society, but production itself helps activate the unemployed; the practice of laboring “instill[s]
within recipients the values, as well as the skills, necessary to confidently enter and remain in the
active workforce”(Waldman 122). Waldman concludes, along with numerous others74, that
workfare is the necessary welfare policy for the liberal state, as it achieves both activation and,
through stipulation, benefits to society.
Waldman’s argument, however underdetermines its conclusion. His claim justifying
activation--that independence is “having a job”--is premised upon a claim he makes earlier.
When he denied the status of right to welfare payments, he implicitly affirmed that welfare
legislation is politically voluntary, thus ensuring its recipients remain dependent upon society’s
goodwill, and therefore making the economy the site of dependence. His argument for denying
this status, however, is missing, besides a brief comment that labeling something as a right
73
74

Elsewhere, Levin-Waldman affirms autonomy as the terminal value of a liberal state.

Discussing the “Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,“ The Economist
remarks that “ten years on, America's work-based welfare reforms have succeeded.” "From Welfare to Workfare."
The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 29 July 2006. Web. 02 May 2017.
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“shields us from responsibility”(Waldman 122). It is never made clear what this responsibility is
for or to. Further, he fails to explain why the “social benefit” expected in return for payments can
not be found in the payment itself a la the release of tension resulting from inequality, but must
include the stipulation of labor. That is, while he has provided justifications for conditions on
payments, namely their political voluntariness, he has not foreclosed the possibility of legislating
unconditioned--yet activation-oriented--policies, leaving open the question of why the state can
not “simply give people money and allow them to do as they please,” while offering the
possibility of skill-increasing programs(Waldman 114). Thus, Waldman leaves us guessing at a
crucial juncture.
However, by examining other liberal critiques of non-workfare policies 75, as well
American judicial thought and practice, we can discern the an oft-cited principle which could
ground Waldman’s--vis a vis the Supreme Court’s--claim that individuals can not receive
payments from the state without corresponding stipulations on labor to be performed: reciprocity.

iv. Reciprocity
Reciprocity is at the heart of numerous liberal arguments. Responding to philosopher Philippe
Van Parijs’ call for “unconditional basic income (UBI), Elizabeth Anderson writes: “in granting a
basic income that is not conditioned on the willingness of the able to work” the UBI both
“offends and undermines the ideal of social obligation that undergirds the welfare state”.76 If the
state gives, it expects to take, too.

75

Presumably the arguments they provide against non-workfare policies would simultaneously support its opposite-workfare policies.
76 Anderson,

Elizabeth. "Optional Freedoms." Boston Review. Boston Review, 17 July 2014. Web. 02 May 2017.
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In the John Adams-authored Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, or the “model for the
Federal Constitution,” Article VI states: “No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have
any other title77 to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those
of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public”.78
This establishes a one-to-one ratio between state-sponsored giving and taking which is later
upheld in its reverse form in the Constitution. Amendment V to the Bill of Rights states: “nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” What the state takes, it
must give, too. Thus, deeming welfare a privilege not only provided justification for the
possibility of conditioned payments, but blocked the very possibility of legislating unconditioned
payments.
One is free to ask, however, why this notion of reciprocity seems baked into American
liberalism, and why it necessitates “services” in return. Examining one of its founding
documents--John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government--we can situate its importance
historically. Specifically, it was meant to foreclose the possibility of a title to ownership
stemming from one’s status by instead requiring it be founded upon labor. Locke begins: “It
having been shown [in the First Treatise]...That Adam had not, either by natural right of
fatherhood, or by positive donation from God, any such authority...or dominion over the world,”
it should be “impossible that...rulers now on earth should make any benefit” from a claim to
being his heir (Locke 7). The background to the Treatise is the rejection of the idea that a title to
ownership deriving from a claim of political status--here being an “heir” to Adam--is legitimate.
77

“A comprehensive term referring to the legal basis for property ownership.” "Title." The Free Dictionary. Farlex,
n.d. Web. 02 May 2017.
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Benjamin, S.B. "EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ARTICLE: THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780." LexisNexis® Litigation Essentials - Error. Temple
University Law Review, Sept. 1997. Web. 02 May 2017.

88

Instead, a claim to ownership must stem from a concrete contribution made by the potential
owner. Thus, Locke claims it is the addition of “labour that was mine” which allows me to
“appropriate [goods] to” myself (Locke 20). Similarly, he states of the now-owner that he had
“annexed to [his recently obtained property] something that was his property 79,” thereby giving
him “title”(Locke 21). To gain property, then, one must give their property as well, annexing the
two together. Once again, a one-to-one ratio between give and take is established.
Thus Locke, in breaking free from monarchy, had to privilege the economic sphere--of
labor and value--over the political sphere--of status and consensus--in the distribution of goods.
He did so by establishing the notion of reciprocity in regards to ownership title. To gain property,
one must give some of one’s own property, labor-power, first--something no king would stoop to.

v. But Wait, There’s More
With the passage of time, Locke’s formula for reciprocity has become complicated. Not only
have political status claims become more nuanced than a monarch’s claiming to be a descendent
of Adam, but economic claims to reciprocity have become harder to detect. While for Locke,
picking up acorns was sufficient to earn a title in them, very few such obvious appropriations
occur in the modern economy. Most people are paid by wage for work that is increasingly
distanced from the actual production of goods. Thus, to say they put out, in their labor-power,
what they receive back in income, is a difficult claim to make.
However, that does not mean economists haven’t tried. One example is the
“uncontroversial concept”--for orthodox economists, at least--of the marginal productivity of
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i.e. his labor
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labor (Felipe and McCombie 2). This states that labor is paid “only what he adds to the firm’s
well-being or utility”.80 As Nozick puts it, distributive justice within a liberal capitalist society is
“To each according to how much he benefits others who have the resources for benefiting those
who benefit them”(Nozick 158). Notice the reciprocity of the exchange: benefit for benefit.
However, evidence abounds that, due its circular nature, there is a “virtual impossibility
of testing the marginal productivity theory” (Felipe and McCombie 12). While consensus has not
been reached on this point, it is salient that the market’s capacity for guaranteeing reciprocity has
been problematized. For example, how much value does one’s marketing of a product add to that
product? While it may increase sales for one firm, there is no evidence that one has added value
to the set of preexisting property. It is thus [ questionable] unclear if reciprocity is met better by
market forces--as Locke contends--than political ones. I will further discuss this possibility in th
next chapter.

vi. Conclusion
First, I discussed points of disagreement regarding ends and means, respectively, in debates on
the future of the “Welfare State”: decommodification versus activation and welfare versus
workfare. Then, I showed that these commitments themselves relied upon differences in ideas
concerning dependence and fault. Next, I provided a simple visualization for a state’s four
possible positions regarding welfare payments. After that, I discussed the American welfare state
from the point of view of its liberal defenders. I showed that the supposed necessity underlying
its dual commitments, to activation and to workfare, was left underdetermined by the liberal
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The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Marginal Productivity Theory." Encyclopædia Britannica.
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 09 June 2006. Web. 02 May 2017.
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argument and implicitly relied upon a commitment to reciprocity. Finally, discussing reciprocity
in historical terms--its initial, specific purpose and its current, fraught status--I provided prima
facie evidence for questioning its basis as a core tenet underlying the justification for workfare as
necessary to a liberal welfare program.
In the next chapter, I will employ contemporary economics and accounting literature to
bring more fully into focus the failure of the market to achieve reciprocity, as understood as a
one-to-one correspondence between the value one creates and the value one receives in return. In
doing so, I cast doubt on the notion that it is the economic sphere, and not political, that more
fully realizes the liberal ideal of reciprocity. If Lockean property rights are instrumental towards
communal good, and a political transfer of wealth can be made which both increases communal
good, as well as does not overstep the principle of reciprocity, then the Lockean liberal fails to
find recourse to object to its implementation.
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VI. Reciprocity under Informational Capitalism

In this final chapter, I combine my previous discussions of the Lockean efficiency thesis and the
liberal commitment to reciprocity with economic history past and present. In doing so, I show
that remaining faithful to Lockean liberalism under modern conditions of production requires
political redistribution of wealth like those entailed in the Periclean payments for social media
usage.
First I restate my contention that Locke instituted private property as instrumental
towards the communal good. Defining this common good as increased efficiency of production
(which under the wastage requirement will redound to society as a whole), I explain his position
from a uniquely economic lens.
In light of this understanding, the choice to restrict the state’s wealth-transferring abilities
to principles of reciprocity appears as a move--in line with Locke’s privileging of labor--to shift
property titles from non-productive, rent-collecting landowners to productive, wage-earning
laborers. Thus, reciprocity is instrumental towards achieving a greater correspondence of
productive labor with remuneration. Insofar as it fails to do this, it loses validity.
Finally, I will show that the specific form of private property rights which uphold many
of the largest firms emerging today--intellectual property rights--fail to achieve reciprocity.
Instead of placing ownership in the hands of productive labor, it places it into a small subset of
productive laborers who are then able to case being productive, instead reaping rents from their
ownership of a scarce resource.
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I will conclude by noting a popular policy response suggested by others who have
discussed the injustice of intellectual property rights. While mine is similar in style, its emphasis
on providing leisure for civic duty responds more directly to mine own plan in this project.

i . Land: Common v. Private
Debates have always raged regarding the morality of private property. While those in favor
property generally argue it is necessary for an effective exploitation of natural resources,
implying the morality of economic growth and the building of civilization, those opposed
generally hold that the appropriation of land is a grave injustice to the natural condition of
nature, man included.
For example, Rousseau once remarked to his fellow men that “you are lost if you forget
that the fruits of the earth belong to all and the earth to no one”(Rousseau 16). For him, not only
is an unequal division of spoils--fruits-- illegitimate, but so is any initial parcelling out the earth.
Lenin once famously demand that “private ownership of [estates] must be abolished immediately
and without compensation”.81 These claims have not disappeared, and neither has their practice:
about three-percent of Israelis live in kibbutz, cooperatives “founded on principles of communal
ownership of property, social justice, and equality”.82
Conversely, economist Ludwig von Mises, namesake of the libertarian Mises Institute,
once declared that: “If history could teach us anything, it would be that private property is
inextricably linked with civilization”.83 While Rousseau may not disagree--he admits that private
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Lenin, V.I. Lenin: On the 'Unauthorised Seizure' of Land. Lenin Internet Archive, 1999. Web. 02 May 2017.
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"About Kibbutz." Kibbutz Program Center. KPC, n.d. Web. 02 May 2017.
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Mises, Ludwig Von. "Human Action." Mises Institute. Mises Institute, n.d. Web. 02 May 2017.
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property was a precursor to civilization as we know it--he would likely object to the normative
force Mises imports to civilization. The strength of his arguments have proven strong enough to
convince Americans to privatize what would seem to be the least likely place for such activity:
the government. In 1991, long before public outrage at the activities of for-profit-prisons, it was
noted in the Harvard Business Review that “Over 11 states are now making use of privately built
and operated correctional facilities; others plan to privatize roadways. At the local level,
communities are turning to private operators to run their vehicle fleets, manage sports and
recreation facilities, and provide transit service”. 84 By placing the building of civilization as their
end goal, these privatizers ignore the moral concerns of private ownership; if man is meant to
build society, how can the step that allows him to do so--privatizing lands and goods--be
immoral?
The two sides speak different languages. For the Rousseau and the communists, the act of
privatization is a trespass on nature that no positive result can justify. For Mises and the
capitalists, privatization is a necessary precursor to the building of a distinctly human nature-civilization. Thus, they do not truly engage each other, but instead fall back into a dispute
between nature versus culture. As I will show later, this allows Locke to embrace both sides. He
both holds that the earth is by nature communal, but that communality can be abridged insofar as
it achieves civilization. However, should communality no longer be an impediment to
civilization building, or should building cease to be of import, private property loses its binding
force.
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Loveman, John B. GoodmanGary W. "Does Privatization Serve the Public Interest?" Harvard Business Review.
Harvard University, 01 Aug. 2014. Web. 02 May 2017.
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Before further expanding on Locke’s position, it would be helpful to understood exactly
why private ownership is understood by capitalists as beneficial to efficient economic
production. To do so, I once again turn to the Mises Institute. They are up to the task because, as
their mission statement reads, they “seek a free-market capitalist economy and a private-property
order that rejects taxation”. 85

ii. Economic Justification of Private Property
For Mises economist Shawn Ritenour, the benefits of private property are threefold: the division
of labor, the accumulation of capital, and the flourishing of entrepreneurship. He summarizes:
Without private property there can be no voluntary exchange nor division of labor. Capitalists will be discouraged
from saving and investment and entrepreneurs will lack the incentive to engage in profitable production. 86

Let me briefly explain each of claim:
1. Division of Labor- By placing the means of production87 in the hands of one firm or
individual, others are forced to “voluntar[ily] exchange” their labor in order to in return employ
these means to produce goods which can then be sold. This allows the owner of the means of
production to determine-- based upon who she decides to exchange with--what position a laborer
will occupy in the scheme of production. This increases production, according to Adam Smith,
for three reasons: “the increase of dexterity in every particular workman,” the “saving of the time
which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another,” and lastly “the
85

"What Is the Mises Institute?" Mises Institute. Mises Institute, 18 June 2014. Web. 02 May 2017.
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Ritenour, Shawn. "How Can Economic Law Help Us Fulfill the Cultural Mandate?" Institute For Faith, Work &
Economics. TIFWE, 24 Sept. 2015. Web. 02 May 2017.
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i.e.“The facilities and resources for producing goods.” "Means of Production." Oxford Living Dictionary. Oxford
University Press, 2017. Web. 23 May 2017.
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invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labor”(Smith 83). By
giving the worker a single repeated task, the worker becomes a specialist. This allows him to
better understand the task, relaying this knowledge to the engineer who then builds machinery to
work in tandem. Private property thus creates a division of labor by creating unequal bargaining
positions between laborers and the owners of the means of production which allows an owner to
dictate a worker’s position in the scheme of production, creating a division of labor. This in turn
creates conditions favorable to increasing productive efficiency through repetition and increased
knowledge.

2. Accumulation of Capital- “For people to have the incentive to accumulate capital,” Ritenour
states, they “must be secure in their property.” Give property to one person, and that person
gains incentive to earn profit from property because she will enjoy all that profit for herself. By
allowing each individual to benefit exclusively from their own activity, private property utilizes
each individual’s ambition towards their own economic gain to increases overall economic gain.
Assured they will reap what they sow, producers give their utmost in sowing.

3. Entrepreneurship- This is closely connected to (2), though with an added negative dimension:
because it holds resource-owning individuals to “strict liability,” private property “helps prevent
the destruction” of the means of production. For example, Ritenour states, private property holds
“would-be polluters...accountable,” deterring landowners from pursuing activities detrimental to
their environment. Not only are individuals able to benefit from the productive use of their
resources as in (2) but they are held accountable for unproductive uses, incentivizing the former.
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Once again, by giving the individual a stake in the exploitation of their resource, private property
is said to encourage proper and efficient economic behavior.

Thus, private property enhances economic productivity by: 1. creating a division of labor
predicated upon differences in resource ownership, 2. allowing individuals to benefit from
efficient production and, 3. making individuals responsible for inefficient production. We can
collapse these distinction, however, into one primary engine of growth: individual responsibility
for resource ownership. If one owns a resource, they are responsible for maintaining that
resource in order to benefit from it, or face economic hardship. This applies both to owners of
means of production as well as those who are forced to sell their labor, the difference being the
resource which must be maintained: a piece of the world, or of the human body. This forces both
the owner of the means of production to maintain his resource, as well as the laborer to sell his
labor in order to earn a wage necessary for his upkeep, thus entering the division of labor.
Therefore, private property creates responsibilities for resources which, although on the surface
identical, are deeply different depending upon the resource owned--a means of production, or
oneself.
A distinction is made, however, between two different owners of the means of
production: the landowner and the capitalist. The difference stems from the resource owned: land
or capital88. When agriculture was the dominant mode of production, land was the most soughtafter resource. One’s wealth, to a large extent, depended upon how much land one had. Thus, the
presence of the “landed gentry” and the fact that colonists in the South--much more dispersed
“Wealth in the form of money or other assets owned by a person or organization or available or contributed for a
particular purpose such as starting a company or investing.” "Capital." Oxford Living Dictionary. Oxford University
Press, 2017. Web. 23 May 2017
88
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than those in the North--were much wealthier(Lindert and Williamson 1). At a certain point,
however, agriculture was overtaken by industrial production which required primarily capital
rather than land. What emerged was the capitalist, who owned means of production in the form
of capital. Of course, land never ceased to be necessary, but instead required the existence of the
capitalist as well, to place machines upon that land. The two forms of ownership continue to coexist. While they are analytically distinct, their difference is one of degree, not kind, as opposed
to the gulf between them and the laborer.

iii. Sources of Income
Having detailed the economic justifications for private property, I will now turn to its results.
Specifically, the streams of wealth that accrue to each individual depending upon their placement
within this scheme of property as either owner of a means of production or of one’s own labor.
The income received by each of these three groups, respectively, can be classified as: rent, profit,
and wages.

A. Rent (or ground rent) is the income received by a landowner simply in virtue of owning the
land on which production occurs. While in his role as a landowner--as opposed to a farmer-he is external to the process of production, he receives some proceeds of production because,
in order for production to begin, he must be convinced to allow the use of his land. By taking
to himself a resource necessary for all production, he mediates between the individual and
their possibility of producing; he has expropriated to himself “the social conditions of
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production.”89 Again, this expropriation in the case of land is understood as necessary for
rational individuals to avoid the so-called “tragedy of the commons” wherein each individual
actor takes from the resource out of self-interest until it is eradicated completely. By placing
someone in charge of the resource, they are able assure--while in pursuit of their own selfinterest-- that the resource is used appropriately over time, and not immediately depleted as
such.

B. Profit is the income that accrues to whomever invests their own capital. After purchasing
labor and paying the rent for land, this individual receives income in the form of profit. This
profit is the difference between the income made by the sale of the goods produced and the
payments this capitalist owed to others for producing them. While at one point the profiteer
was part of production--like the individual entrepreneur who runs her own business--she is
increasingly distinct from the actual managing of production: the capitalist “can easily limit
himself to providing the means of production,” like the rentier does with his land. Thus the
capitalist, like the rentier, is exterior to the process of production.

C. Wage is the share of the products of industry received by labor for its work. Because wages
are remuneration for laboring, and not for a product itself, wages are typically based upon
time spent laboring. Crucially, this is the only income stream which goes to those who
“furnish labor required by the technology embodied in capital assets”(Minsky 172). In other
words, wage-earners are the only group which actually creates using the means of production.

89

Rent is the “the result of a process of expropriation of the social conditions of production and
reproduction”(Vasquez and Gonzales).
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Thus only the wage earners are absolutely necessary, and not the product of contingent social
relations. They are the “produce[rs] [of] the surplus-value90 that is at the origin of the
production of both profit and rent”; their work pays for the incomes of those who are
extraneous to production(Vercellone). While the two former classes are results of the
particular legal scheme of private property, existing to ensure resources are used effectively, it
is only this last class that is actually necessary to produce goods using those resources. The
former acts as management, the latter as workers.

To recap, we have found that the economic justification for private property rests upon the
responsibility which it lays upon each individual to care for their own resources. Because
individuals--or firms--are liable to shoulder the benefits of efficient production or suffer the
consequences of inefficient production, it is assumed that individual’s ambitions and concern for
their own well-being will drive them to undertake the former. With each citizen maximizing
production to the best of their abilities out of self-love, economic growth is thereby maximized
for society as a whole.
We then distinguished between different kinds of resource-ownership, identifying the
different streams of income which accrue to individuals for occupying each. We found that the
groups which receive income due to ownership of private property outside of their own labor-rentiers and profiteers--are extraneous to the actual production of goods. It is only the last group,
wage-earners, owners of their own labor power, who are necessary to produce goods regardless
of the particular scheme of property rights in place. Put more somberly: “capitalists [rentiers and

90

Surplus value is the value created in goods by laborers which does not get paid back to those laborers.
In that sense, “surplus value is generated by unpaid labor”(Fuchs 183).
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profiteers] are unproductive...they do not produce value...profit stems from the production of
value by workers that is exploited and appropriated by capitalists”(Fuchs 184)(emphasis mine).

iv. Locke & Property
In light of these distinctions, we can revisit and better categorize our two liberal commitments:
the efficiency thesis and the principle of reciprocity. Specifically, I will show that Locke’s
efficiency thesis was a result of his both holding that land was by nature communal, but also that
appropriation was necessary so as to achieve greater production of goods. After reaffirming
private property, however, the question of who was to be given private property--thus becoming
rentiers and profiteers--was up for grabs. Locke, in connecting property to labor, and in
restricting government payments to citizens to cases in which labor is received in return, was
attempting to shift property titles from the unproductive aristocracy who were extraneous to
production, to the productive workers necessary for production. His privileging of the economic
sphere over the political in the distribution of wealth, therefore, was not an absolutist position but
one meant to achieve greater reciprocity between one’s productivity and one’s remuneration.

a. Communal Earth, Private Property
As I remarked earlier, the debate over private property largely centers around which virtue is
fundamental to the state: the prevention of injustice, defined as the appropriation of what should
be communal land and resources, or increased productivity, understood as a necessary precursor
to building civilization. Locke himself is divided, though liable to sacrifice the former for the
latter. At one point, he directly acknowledges the communal nature of the earth: “God hath given
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the world to men in common”(Locke 19). Still, he affirms that in order for an individual to
benefit from a piece of this earth which they were given “another can no longer have any right to
it”(Locke 19). Thus for Locke, Rousseau states an impossibility when he says “the fruits of the
earth belong to all and the earth to no one.” It is only by belonging to some individual--following
classical economic theory--that the earth can be made to bear its “fruit.”
Thus Locke asserts private property rights along with a spoilage limitation to gain the
best of both worlds. While private ownership allows the earth to be made fruitful, the limitation
upon spoilage ensures that this fruit, while not given to all equally, will at least go to those in
need rather than spoil. Even for a communist, this is better than a situation in which no excess is
produced, as we can assume Locke believed would be the case if private property were
abolished. While indeed the earth along with its fruits belong to all, it is only by giving some
ownership over that earth that its fruit can come into existence. And, while the owner gains the
right to enjoy the fruits of her labor--as is necessary to achieve the responsibility which enables
efficient production--she is bounded by certain rules, only able to accumulate gold and silver, not
useful goods.

b. Private Property, Reciprocal Title
Private property was not a new phenomena when Locke was writing. As I showed, he left it in
place despite his communitarian sympathies for purposes of economic growth. What he did not
leave in place was to whom this ownership of land was to be accorded. In England, his home,
land title was accorded based on political privilege: “most farmers did not own the land they
cultivated but leased it from a small group of landowners, mostly members of the
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aristocracy”(Arnold-Baker 323). This practice began in 1236 with the Statute of Merton which
established “the right of lords of the manor to enclose commons and waste lands.”91 Thus while
preserving a right to private property, Locke altered its foundation. Rather than political title-once justified as being due to royalty’s being descended from Adam--he places it within the
economic sphere as a result of performing labor. In doing so, he shifts ownership of the means of
production from rentiers, who owned property for political reasons, to the wage laborers, who
received income from their productive activities. In other words, he moved the ownership of land
from the non-productive class external to production to the class which produces actual surplusvalue through work--the laborers. He did this by connecting property title to the individual’s
ability to labor for consumption, and nothing else.

c. Locke’s Economics
We can characterize Locke’s private property arguments--understood according to the efficiency
thesis--as follows:
1. A continuation of private property due to practical economic concerns.
2. A spoilage requirement to ensure the excess production enabled by private property redounds to society as a
whole.
3. A moving of ownership title from the non-productive rentier class to the productive laboring class.

The necessity of holding governments to the principle of reciprocity is clear. To ensure (3), or,
the granting of value in the form of property titles to the laborer, and not the rentier, Locke
formulated a direct connection between the state’s ability to grant wealth--in this case through a
Green, Lionel. "LIONEL GREEN, Responding to a Request from the Mayor, Explains THE STATUTE OF
MERTON." Comp. Peter Hopkins. THE STATUTE OF MERTON. 138 (2001): n. pag. Merton Historical Society,
June 2001. Web.
91
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protected property title--and labor performed by the individual for the state. In doing so, he
invalidated any purely political ascription of property title to aristocrat--as was the case in
England-- unless that aristocrat was prepared to work for his keep, an unlikely scenario. Thus
reciprocity was meant, within the framework of private property, to ensure the shift of property
titles from non-productive to productive labor. While including labor as a necessary prerequisite
for earning property created this link in the first place, reciprocity was meant as a check on
government action to prevent its being overridden in favor of aristocrats.

v. From Land to Capital
Land ceased to be the dominant resource once the Industrial Revolution and its factory systems
took hold. Replacing the combination of man and land found in agriculture, the factory placed
the machine between the two. Another resource, capital, in the form of the wealth necessary to
acquire machines or just machines themselves, became the dominant means of production.
When capital took hold, a similar debate to the one over the morality of privately owned
land occurred. Before 1933, America’s monetary system was a gold standard, restricting the level
of capital within the economy to a certain proportion with the amount of gold held by the nation .
The means of production were no longer naturally restricted, but artificially so. To that end,
labor-friendly politician William Jennings Bryan relayed at the 1896 Democratic Convention:
Having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world, supported by the commercial interests, the
laboring interests, and the toilers everywhere, we will answer [investors’] demand for a gold standard by saying to
them: You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a
cross of gold. 92
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"William Jennings Bryan's "Cross of Gold" Speech July 9, 1896, at the Democratic National Convention,
Chicago." (n.d.): n. pag. Carnegie Mellon University, 2 May 2017. Web. 4 May 2017.
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Like Locke, Bryan is siding with productive over non-productive labor, the wage-earner over the
profiteer. Rather than call for the title of ownership to means of production be moved from one
class to the other, Bryan seeks the expansion of the artificially scarce means of production so that
profiteers cease to exist. Similarly, J.M. Keynes once called for the expansion of capital and
thereby the “euthanasia of the rentier” or, of the “cumulative oppressive power of the capitalist to
exploit the scarcity-value of capital” which allows her to dictate the division of labor and the
collection of profits(Cate 24). The discussion has come a long way; where Rousseau argued
against appropriation, these more modern figures restrict themselves to calling for the expansion
of the existing means.
The Mises Institute is not mum on this point either, declaring their rejection of Bryan’s
proposed “monetary debasement” as their second highest priority.93 For Mises himself, the
printing of capital makes the delivering of new, less valuable dollars to fulfill a preexisting
contract akin to “what it would be if you agreed to deliver a horse to another party but instead of
a horse you delivered a chicken, saying, ‘This is all right ... I say that this chicken means a
horse’”(Mises 12). By increasing the level of capital, and making it easier to acquire means of
production, government allows “individuals [to]...fail to fulfill promises they have made”(Mises
14).
The question is once again one of responsibility: if the individual knows it will become
easier over time to acquire cash, she may sign contracts which initially appear difficult to fulfill,
relying upon this expectation of later ease. If so, the individual is much less on the hook to bear
the brunt of any potential default of their contract; their incentive to produce effectively is
93
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diminished. Bryan of course doesn’t share Mises’ concern for a lack of incentive to produce; his
constituents, as he refers to them, are “toilers.” However, following economic doctrine, Mises
rejects monetary expansion because it decreases absolute individual responsibility, thereby
dampening the ability of personal ambition to fuel the economy.

vi. From Capital to Knowledge
No longer agriculture or manufacturing, but “immaterial labor” is “increasingly recognized as
the principal source of value in the contemporary economy”(Spence and Carter 304). Immaterial
labor is defined as “labour which creates immaterial products such as knowledge, information,
communications or relationships,” typically breaking down into categories of either intellectual
labor or service work(Spence and Carter 305). While autonomous machines increasingly take
over the sphere of direct production, labor becomes “linguistic acts, a sequence of assertions, and
a symbolic interaction” to regulate, surveil, and coordinate the labor performed by physical
machinery (Lucarelli and Fumagalli 77).
Consider the three most popular jobs in the U.S. in 2013 according to the Bureau of
Labor Statistics: salesperson, cashier, and food service. All three regulate customer’s purchases
of goods produced elsewhere, while providing “customer service with a smile.” Labor is less
demanding physically than it is emotionally. Or, consider the field of coding and software
production--the top-five companies in the U.S. by market cap 94 all produce extensive software-which is less physically demanding than it is intellectually. While these types of jobs have
always existed, it is their increasing prevalence that causes many to refer to the oncoming stage
94

e.g. Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon.com, Facebook. "Largest Companies by Market Cap Today ." Largest
Companies by Market Cap Today - Dogs of the Dow. Dogs of the Dow, n.d. Web. 02 May 2017.
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of capitalism as “informational capitalism,” with “information jobs” in 2010 already making up
47.9% of all wage labor in the U.S. (Fuchs 180). The primary means of production are no longer
land or capital, but the accumulation of and expropriation of knowledge.
P.F. Drucker describes this method of production as the application of knowledge “to
knowledge itself”(Drucker 60). As opposed to industrial production, in which worker’s
movements were studied so as to improve their efficiency, it is now data which is being studied
so as to improve overall efficiency. For example, Google uses the data it collects on individual
habits so as to better coordinate its search function, improving its product. Similarly, Uber uses
the data it collects on cab requests to alter its pricing to better coordinate supply and demand 95. It
is these companies’ ability to compile data in one location--Google by serving as a portal to the
web, Uber by acting as the meeting place of exchange between taxi drivers and would-be riders-and then serve up that data effectively that makes them so valuable.
Uber provides a good example of the primary types of jobs the informational economy
offers: complex problem solving--the software engineers--and service work--the drivers.
Importantly, both rely upon knowledge: the former theoretical knowledge, the latter emotional
knowledge. The latter can be seen in riders’ ability to rate their driver’s quality: “social skills and
a ‘good attitude’” are demanded from “workers in all spheres”(Spence and Carter 305).
What both these qualities have in common is that their production is not limited to the
workplace--certainly coders come in with knowledge of software, and drivers the ability to deal
with humans--but occurs within what some call the “social factory”(Spence and Carter 305).
This is simply recognition that knowledge, in whatever form, is not simply the result of on-the-
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job training as, say, machinists’ work is, but is garnered throughout human experience. This
“recognition of the General Intellect 96 as the main source of value in capitalism causes us to
rethink the boundaries between work and life”(Spence and Carter 307). It also helps us to
understand the current movement toward work-life balance97 ; rather than a conciliation to the
laborer, it is an understanding by business that increasingly, what happens outside the office
contributes to what happens within. Thus, the growing prominence of knowledge within
capitalism--both theoretical and emotional--leads to the understanding that work is, in a certain
sense, always being performed. If the brain is one’s resource, one never ceases to refine it; fixed
capital, or, the means of production, are “man himself”(Drucker 61).
Noting the fact that knowledge is socially produced and yet individually expropriated
through intellectual property rights, Christian Fuchs writes:
In informational capitalism, knowledge has become a productive force, but knowledge is produced not only in corporations in the
form of knowledge goods, but also in everyday life, for example, by parents who educate their children; citizens who engage in
everyday politics; consumers of media who produce social meaning and hence are prosumers; users of MySpace, YouTube,
Facebook, and similar sites, who produce informational content that is appropriated by capital; radio listeners and television
viewers who call in live on air to discuss with studio guests and convey their ideas that are instantly commodified in the real-time
economy, and so on. The production process of knowledge is a social, common process, but knowledge is appropriated by
capital. (Fuchs 186)(emphasis mine)

With this in mind, he goes on to state that within information capitalism, “nobody is
unproductive since each human being is producing and reproducing the commons appropriated
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Understood as ‘“that heritage of cooperative production marked in language, common feeling and enjoyment, and
in science and technique, to invent ever most sophisticated forms of interdependence”(Cart Spence 306; or original
quote from Harney 2007).
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by capital,” referring to the social milieu which allows knowledge creation and dissemination as
the “commons”(Fuchs 193)(emphasis mine).
We have come full circle from Rousseau. The means of production, here knowledge
rather than land, is decried by labor-sympathetic authors to be the property of all, not some.
While for Rousseau this is because the earth is held in common, for Fuchs and others, this is
because the world of knowledge is made in common: “in a knowledge society, social life
becomes productive”(Fuchs 193). This results from the nature of knowledge, as it disperses and
grows through human contact.
Fuchs then identifies two classes of workers within this scheme: direct knowledge
workers, such as coders, who produce the knowledge goods which are then patented by firms
and sold to consumers, and indirect knowledge workers who produce the “social conditions”
necessary for this knowledge accumulation such as teachers, student, parents, friends, and others
who add to understanding, both theoretical and emotional(Fuchs 186). While both labor, only the
former are paid in the form of rents for appropriating from this intellectual “commons,” through
the use of patents and intellectual property rights (IPRs), while the the latter are forced to endure
precarious employment.
Returning to Locke, it seems clear that IPRs do not serve the same ends which he had set
for private property. Specifically, it does not increase reciprocity by creating a more direct link
between labor and ownership, but instead decreases that link by cutting out “‘the collaboration
and coordination of a multitude of agents’” in favor of a single individual or entity who is then
appropriated title (Vazquez and Gonzalez). Rather than shifting title from non-productive to
productive labor, it shifts it from one group of productive laborers--society generally--to another,
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select individuals who apply for patents. Thus, IPRs continue the practice of private property,
and thereby rent, while decreasing reciprocity by failing to give property titles to productive
laborers--society at large.

vii. Conclusion
If, as I have shown, the modern economy fails to respond to reciprocity, then Locke’s
justifications for restricting government transfers to the principle of reciprocity--meant to keep
property titles in the hands of productive labor--is thrown in doubt. While for many authors,
recognition of the shared nature of knowledge production implies the necessity of a universal
basic income so as to compensate for the “literal theft” that is IPRs (Spence and Carter), I would
take a different route.
If, as seems likely to continue to be the case, IPRs are granted, then we should hold those
who appropriate the “General Intellect” to the same standard upon which we hold those who
appropriate land--they are responsible for its care. In the case of land, this means that, should
they destroy the land, they have lost their property. In the case of social knowledge this means
that, should they appropriate the work of society at large, they must simultaneously ensure the
continuation of a society capable of producing increased knowledge by enabling individuals to
obtain the economic security and leisure time conducive to gaining an intellectual and emotional
intelligence. Thus, my argument comes full circle. The provision of leisure through income
which allows individuals to partake in social media, calming the storms of dissent, is the same
governmental policy which Locke would propose in the face of informational capitalism.
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